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THE REAGAN JUDICIARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: THE IMPACT OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
William E. Kovacic* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern economic regulation in the United States recently passed 
the twentieth anniversary of one of its most important formative 
events. On January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)l and launched a revolution in 
environmental policy. 2 Since NEPA's enactment, Congress has 
passed an unparalleled collection of statutes designed to protect the 
environment. The subjects of these statutes are familiar topics 
of academic discourse and popular debate: clean air, 3 clean 
Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. This Article is based in 
part on a working paper entitled "The Reagan Judiciary Examined: A Comparison of Envi-
ronmental Law Voting Records of Carter and Reagan Appointees to the Federal Courts of 
Appeals" (Washington Legal Foundation, Working Paper No. 36 (Oct. 1989». The author 
thanks the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Sarah Scaife Foundation for support in 
preparing this article. The author is grateful to Michael Greve, Michael McDonald, Shannon 
O'Chester, and Alan Siobodin for many useful comments and suggestions, and to Sean Coleman 
and Steven Taylor for their research assistance. 
1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988». See also Symposium on NEPA at Twenty: The 
Past, Present and Future of the National Environmental Policy Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 447 (1990) 
(collection of articles discussing NEPA's significance). 
2 See R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
28 (1983) ("[tJhe year 1970 was a watershed for pollution control"). Among other initiatives in 
1970, President Nixon issued a reorganization plan that created the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) by consolidating environmental protection units located in other federal agen-
cies. See Reorganization Plan No.3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970). In January 1990, 
President Bush endorsed proposals that the EPA be raised to cabinet-level status. See The 
President's News Conference, 26 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 88, 89 (Jan. 24, 1990). 
3 The principal pieces of clean air legislation have been the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990); the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 
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water, 4 ocean dumping,5 toxic waste,6 noise, 7 pesticides,8 land use,9 
and endangered species. 10 These environmental statutes and their 
implementing regulations constitute the most sweeping and signifi-
cant program of American economic regulation in the post-World 
War II era. ll 
Most scholarly commentary has endorsed a basic goal underpin-
ning federal environmental statutes: economic actors should be in-
duced to internalize the negative spillovers associated with pollu-
tion. 12 The form of federal intervention since 1970 to achieve this 
84 Stat. 1676. These measures are codified or in the case of the 1990 amendments will be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). 
4 The principal clean water statutes since 1970 have been the Water Quality Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7; the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 
88 Stat. 1660; and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-498,86 Stat. 816. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments and the 1987 
Water Quality Act are codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). The Safe Drinking Water 
Act, as amended, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f~00j (1988). 
5 See Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-531, 86 
Stat. 1052 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1988». 
6 The major statutes have included the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767; the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795; and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). These measures are codified 
at scattered sections of title 42 of the United States Code. 
7 See Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1988». 
8 See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 
973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988». 
9 See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988». 
10 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988». 
11 In a speech in 1980, Gus Speth, Chairman of the President's Council on Environmental 
Quality, described the environmental statutes of the 1970s as "a single sustained burst of 
legislation, almost without precedent in our history." Speth, Environmental Regulation and 
the ImMOBILization of Truth, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 413, 414 (1980). Speth referred 
to the 1970s as the "decade of environmental renaissance" and likened congressional activism 
in this period to "creative bursts of legislation during the 1930's for the New Deal, and the 
1960's civil rights." Id.; see also Reilly, The Future of Environmental Law, 6 YALE J. ON 
REG. 351, 351 (1989) (written by EPA Administrator William K. Reilly). "During the 1970s, 
we passed close to a dozen major environmental laws meant to protect us in a relatively 
comprehensive way. For the first time in history, an industrialized, technologically advanced 
nation enacted sweeping federal legislation to protect human health, natural systems, and the 
environment nationwide." Reilly, supra, at 35!. 
12 The failure of markets in dealing with negative environmental spillovers is treated in R. 
CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN 
AIR 58-80 (1983). See also R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 
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end, however, has drawn extensive criticism. In particular, many 
observers have criticized the federal regulatory regime for its fre-
quent use of "command and control" abatement strategies and for 
its failure to take appropriate account of the costs associated with 
achieving additional incremental cuts in emissions. 13 Critics fre-
quently focus on statutory and regulatory requirements that impose 
especially stringent abatement ceilings upon new sources of emis-
sions, or on "technology-forcing"14 standards that deny firms the 
flexibility to choose the lowest cost reduction approach.15 In the last 
fifteen years, a large body of legal and economic literature has sug-
gested alternative methods and incentives for achieving important 
pollution control objectives at costs much lower than those imposed 
by existing regulatory requirements. 16 
36--37 (1983); D. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 46-53, 331-84 (1989); R. STEWART 
& J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 97-117 (1978). This is not to suggest that 
the desire to internalize external costs of pollution is necessarily the only concern, or even 
the dominant objective, animating adoption of environmental protection statutes and regula-
tions. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (discussing 
efforts to use Clean Air Act to protect eastern coal producers from low-sulphur coal suppliers 
located in western United States); Bartel & Thomas, Predation Through Regulation: The 
Wage and Profit Effects of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, 30 J.L. & ECON. 239 (1987) (discussing use of environ-
mental regulations to enable incumbent suppliers to deter entry and expansion by rival firms); 
Brady, Maloney & Abbott, Political Limits of the Market for "BAT Medallions," REGULA-
TION, Winter 1990, at 61 (identifying political obstacles to attaining an economically efficient 
market for pollution permits). 
13 In a representative assessment in 1983, Robert Crandall said that "[t]here is overwhelm-
ing evidence that the current approach to setting environmental standards for air quality is 
extremely inefficient." See R. CRANDALL, supra note 12, at 57. For similar evaluations, see 
S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 261-84 (1982); A. KNEESE, ECONOMICS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 108-11 (1977); B. YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REG-
ULATION: TRACKING THE UNICORN (1989); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental 
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Crandall, Air Pollution, Environmentalists, and the 
Coal Lobby, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION 84 (R. Noll & B. Owen eds. 
1983); Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (1985); Weiss, Introduction: The Regulatory Reform Movement, in REGULATORY 
REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 9 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1986). 
14 See LaPierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 
IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977) (analyzing "technology-for~ing" strategy for pollution control). 
16 See R. CRANDALL, supra note 12, at 60-61. A distinctive feature of the Clean Air Act 
of 1990 is its reliance upon market-based incentives to achieve reductions in sulphur dioxide. 
See Pavetto & Bae, Acid Rain Now a Hot Commodity, Legal Times, Feb. 11, 1991, at 39, 
col. 1. 
16 See S. BREYER, supra note 13, at 261-84 (1982); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, 
PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Prob-
lems: Not Exactly What the Doctor Ordered, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GoVERNMENT 
REGULATION 131-81 (J. Shogren ed. 1989); Law and Economics Symposium: New Directions 
in Environmental Policy, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988); Passell, Private Incentives as 
Pollution Curb, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at D2, col. 1; cf. Magat & Viscusi, Effectiveness 
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This Article focuses on the influence that President Reagan's ju-
dicial appointments to the courts of appeals have had on environ-
mental policymaking. Following a brief look at some of the mecha-
nisms that the Reagan administration used to shape environmental 
policy, this Article examines the voting patterns of the appointees 
of Presidents Carter and Reagan on the federal courts of appeals. 
Further, a detailed study of two subsets of environmental cases, 
Clean Air Act decisions and Clean Water Act decisions, provides 
data to assist the reader in measuring shifts in judicial attitudes with 
respect to environmental regulation. This data suggests that judges 
appointed by President Reagan are more inclined than those judges 
appointed by President Carter to adopt positions that either narrow 
the application of existing pollution abatement requirements or dis-
courage the recognition of new abatement obligations. The creation 
of ReaganlBush supermajorities on the courts of appeals may lay 
the foundation for increasingly critical judicial scrutiny of pollution 
abatement restrictions. 17 
President Reagan's environmental policy goals and his efforts to 
achieve ideological uniformity in the judiciary are presented in Sec-
tion II of this Article. The Article then presents the study of the 
judicial voting patterns in three parts. Section III describes the 
study's methodology. The observations are based on a review of 290 
decisions handed down by the courts of appeals between January 20, 
1977, and November 30, 1990. Section IV then outlines results of 
the survey of Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act decisions. Section 
V sets out the qualitative features of the survey data. The data 
reveals a sharper dichotomy in voting patterns between the Carter 
and Reagan appointees on the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit than on other courts of appeals. The data reflects 
a similar disparity, between Carter and Reagan appointee voting, in 
of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & 
ECON. 331 (1990) (finding that EPA inspection programs have yielded compliance with water 
pollution regulations for pulp and paper industry, and that remaining challenge of water 
pollution control efforts is to set abatement standards that effectively balance benefits with 
compliance costs). 
In 1982, the General Accounting Office estimated that replacing command-and-control tech-
niques with greater reliance on market-oriented incentives could result in a 40% to 90% 
reduction in pollution control costs. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A MARKET ApPROACH 
TO AIR POLLUTION CONTROL COULD REDUCE COMPLIANCE COSTS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING 
CLEAN AIR GOALS 32 (1982). In the same year, the Congressional Budget Office calculated 
that, by the year 2000, the United States could save $3.3 billion annually by permitting electric 
utilities to meet SUlphur dioxide abatement goals by burning low-sulphur coal rather than by 
using mandated chemical treatment methods. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT, THE ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND THE COAL MARKET 62 (1982). 
17 See infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text. 
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a review of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
decisions involving the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). Section V also presents evidence suggesting that the Rea-
gan appointees are more inclined than their Carter counterparts to 
place jurisdictional and remedial hurdles in the paths of private 
litigants seeking to enforce or expand pollution abatement require-
ments. 18 The analysis concludes with a look at the likely impact that 
President Bush's appointments will have upon court of appeals de-
cisions on environmental issues. 19 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
When he assumed the presidency in 1981, Ronald Reagan placed 
near the top of his domestic policy agenda the goal of reducing 
compliance burdens associated with environmental controls and 
other federal health and safety regulations. 20 In his first State of the 
Union message, the new President said that "a virtual explosion in 
governmental regulation during the past decade" had caused "higher 
prices, higher unemployment, and lower productivity growth. "21 
President Reagan disavowed any "intention of dismantling the reg-
ulatory agencies, especially those necessary to protect [the] environ-
ment and assure the public health and safety. "22 But he warned that 
"we must come to grips with inefficient and burdensome regulations, 
eliminate those we can and reform the others. "23 Among the first 
initiatives of his administration, President Reagan established a 
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief to identify approaches 
for curbing existing regulatory controls. 24 
18 See infra notes 113-44 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 152-65 and accompanying text. 
20 The basic elements of President Reagan's regulatory reform agenda are described in G. 
EADS & M. FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM: REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984); Nathan, The 
Reagan Presidency in Domestic Affairs, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY: AN EARLY ASSESS-
MENT 48 (F. Greenstein ed. 1983). See also M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF 
DEREGULATION 212-13 (1985) (discussing importance of environmental protection as a target 
of Reagan administration regulatory reform); Mosher, Reagan and Environmental Protec-
tiorlr-None of the Laws Will Be Untouchable, Nat'l J., Jan. 3, 1981, at 17. "[1]f anything can 
be predicted in the new Administration, it is an effort to trim the powers of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and other environmental regulators." Mosher, supra, at 17. 
21 Program for Economic Recovery-Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 17 
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 130, 135-36 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
22 [d. at 136. 
23 [d. 
24 In announcing the formation of the Task Force, the President said: 
[R legulatory reform . . . is one of the keystones in our program to return the Nation 
to prosperity and to set loose again the ingenuity and energy of the American people. 
Government regulations impose an enormous burden on large and small businesses 
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The Reagan administration immediately focused upon federal en-
vironmental protection policy in its regulatory reform efforts. The 
attempted redirection took several forms. The Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) conducted more exacting cost-benefit reviews of 
proposed regulations.25 President Reagan initially appointed less in-
tervention-oriented leadership to head the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).26 The Reagan administration substantially reduced 
the EPA's budget, causing major staff cuts and reducing the agency's 
ability to initiate new enforcement matters.27 The EPA experi-
mented more extensively with market-based economic pollution 
abatement incentives to replace command and control techniques.28 
in America, discourage productivity, and contribute substantially to our current 
economic woes. 
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief-Remarks Announcing the Establishment of 
the Task Force, 17 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 33, 33~4 (Jan. 22, 1981). 
25 See R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF Two 
AGENCIES 100-13, 257-58 (1989); Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & 
. Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 
12,291,4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984). 
26 See G. EADS & M. FIX, supra note 20, at 140-48; R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, supra note 
25, at 113-24; K. MEIER, REGULATION-POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMICS 163-65 
(1985); Langenfeld & Walton, RegUlatory Reform Under Reagan-The Right Way and the 
Wrong Way, in REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA 41, 57-58 (R. Meiners & B. Yandle eds. 
1989). The crucial element of the Reagan administration's appointments strategy at the EPA 
was the selection of Ann Burford to head the agency. Professors Harris and Milkis aptly 
summarize the impact of Burford's contentious tenure at the EPA: 
In the wake of disappointments within the business community, outrage among 
environmentalists, a drumbeat of criticism from the media about politicizing the EPA, 
and a contempt citation from Congress for refusing to turn over agency documents 
for legislative hearings, Ann Burford stepped down as administrator .... [B]y 1983 
the EPA was at its nadir in terms of effectiveness and credibility. 
R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, supra note 25, at 264-65. 
~ See R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, supra note 25, at 255-56; P. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 9 (1987); cf. Kovacic, Public Choice and the Public Interest: Federal 
Trade Commission Enforcement During the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 
467, 485, 497-500 (1988) (discussing Reagan administration's use of budget cuts to constrain 
regulatory activities of Federal Trade Commission). But see Ludwiszewski, Reagan Team 
Fought Pollution in the Courts, Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1988, at A32, col. 3 (disputing view that 
EPA enforcement activity declined during first term of Reagan administration). 
28 See generally R. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND 
TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE (1986); Hahn & Lester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An 
Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989); Tietenberg, 
Uncommon Sense: The Program to Reform Pollution Control Policy, in REGULATORY RE-
FORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED? 280~01 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1986); Tripp & 
Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 
YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1989); Note, The Iron and Steel Industry Consent Decree: Implementing 
the Bubble Policy Under the Clean Water Act, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 155 (1984). In 
important respects, EPA efforts during the 1980s to use market-oriented incentives built upon 
programs, such as the use of "bubbles," first devised in the 1970s. See Costle, The Environ-
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These reform approaches yielded few enduring policy adjustments, 
when measured against the robust expectations that accompanied 
the beginning of the Reagan presidency.29 In addition, a much-antic-
ipated legislative effort to loosen the requirements of the Clean Air 
Act and the Clean Water Act never materialized. 30 
Beyond these direct strategies for regulatory reform, President 
Reagan attempted to use judicial appointments to change the course 
of federal regulatory policy. The Reagan administration reshaped 
the federal judiciary from 1981 through 1988. President Reagan 
appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, selected three 
mental Protection Agency's Initiatives, in REFORMING REGULATION 130 (T. Clark, M. Kosters 
& J. Miller III eds. 1980) (discussing EPA experiments with bubbles during Carter adminis-
tration); Landau, Economic Dream or Environmental Nightmare? The Legality of the "Bubble 
Concept" in Air and Water Pollution Control, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 741 (1980) 
(discussing origins of the EPA's alternative emission production options policy). The Reagan 
administration's efforts in the mid-1980s to extend these programs took place only after the 
resignation of Ann Burford as EPA Administrator. Burford had viewed the EPA's market-
oriented abatement experiments of the 1970s with suspicion because such initiatives had their 
roots in the Carter administration. See Langenfeld & Walton, supra note 26, at 57. 
29 Crandall, What Ever Happened to Deregulation?, in ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 
271, 280 (D. Boaz ed. 1988). 
When the Reagan administration assumed office, it was expected to tackle the en-
vironmental issues with a vengeance. At the very least, it would slow the pace of 
new regulations and offer new clean-air legislation for congressional consideration. 
Unfortunately, a concerted assault on environmental issues never occurred, in part 
because of minor numerous controversies within EPA. 
Id. For similar assessments of Reagan administration efforts to redirect environmental policy, 
see R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, supra note 25, at 275-76; Langenfeld & Walton, supra note 26, 
at 55-59; Smith, What Environmental Policy?, in ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS, supra, 
at 333; Stroup, Environmental Policy, REGULATION, Winter 1988, at 43. 
30 See M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, supra note 20, at 213; Crandall, supra note 29, at 281-
84. Several commentators have noted that the Reagan administration not only failed to roll 
back existing statutory requirements but acquiesced in the enactment of new legislative 
commands. See Crandall, supra note 29, at 284. 
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of environmental policy in the past six years 
has been the steady shift from pollution control to political pork barrel. ... The 1986 
Superfund legislation created a new, broadbased business-tax program of $1.8 billion 
per year that is more a pork barrel than a serious environmental program. . .. That 
the Reagan administration could not slow this assault on the taxpayer is evidence of 
its impotence in the environmental area. 
Id.; see also Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988). 
Id. 
The American public ... correctly perceived that the Reagan administration's policies 
would sacrifice [environmental] goals. Recent Congressional legislation has revived 
the environmental regulatory strategies of the early 70's, enacting ambitious and 
detailed command and control programs for hazardous waste control and cleanup. 
These statutes include highly specific, court-enforced mandates and deadlines for 
administrative enforcement. 
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new members of the Supreme Court, and accounted for forty-seven 
percent of all judges sitting on the federal district courts and circuit 
courts of appeals.31 In making these appointments, the Reagan ad-
ministration sought to alter the federal judiciary's ideological per-
spective by choosing individuals who were more likely to doubt the 
efficacy of economic regulation. 32 Although the notion that a presi-
dent would use judicial appointments to achieve desired policy ends 
is not remarkable,33 the Reagan administration's attempt to attain 
ideological uniformity often is said to have been unmatched in its 
determination and thoroughness. 34 
The ideology of the Reagan appointees is especially important to 
the formation of federal environmental policy. For the past twenty 
years, federal judges have played a pivotal role in determining the 
scope and content of pollution abatement statutes and other envi-
ronmental policy measures. 35 "Recent history," Judge Malcolm 
31 Sheldon Goldman has calculated that President Reagan filled 346 of the 736 positions on 
the federal courts of appeals and district courts. Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Com-
pleting the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 318-19 (1989). 
32 See H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS, 8-9 (1988); Wermiel, Reagan Choices Alter 
the Makeup and Views of the Federal Courts, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 1; The 
Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, Nat'1. L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22; Law and Economics: A 
New Order in the Court?, Bus. WK., Nov. 16, 1987, at 93; Reagan Justice: A Conservative 
Legacy on the Appellate Courts, Legal Times, May-June 1988 (special supplement) [herein-
after Reagan Justice]. 
33 See Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts' Role in Regulating 
America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 1984 AMER. BAR FOUND. 
RES. J. 285 (1984). 
34 See D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 102 
(1990) (observing that the Reagan administration used "the most rigorous process for judicial 
selection ever"); H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 9 ("the current conservative campaign to 
achieve ideological purity throughout the federal judiciary goes beyond prior efforts. . . . it 
is being pressed with much greater determination and much more systematically .... "); 
Bandow, The Conservative Judicial Agenda: A Critique, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE 
JUDICIARY 257, 264-65 (J. Dorn & H. Manne eds. 1987) (observing that the Reagan Justice 
Department's judicial selection process "though no more partisan than that of past presidents, 
places greater emphasis on ideology"); Freiwald, The Mission: Stock Bench, Legal Times, 
May-June 1988, at 6, 7 (segment from special supplement Reagan Justice, supra note 32). 
If experts differ on the lasting ideological impact of the new Reagan judges, almost 
everyone agrees that the administration's methodology in choosing them represented 
a sharp break with tradition. No longer was loyalty to the party, or trial and litigating 
experience, as important as was a well-documented fealty to conservative ideology. 
Freiwald, supra, at 7; see also Goldman, supra note 31, at 319-20. "Arguably, the Reagan 
administration was engaged in the most systematic judicial philosophical screening of judicial 
candidates ever seen in the nation's history, surpassing Franklin Roosevelt's administration." 
Goldman, supra, at 319-20. 
35 See, e.g., R. MELNICK, supra note 2, at 1. "The federal courts [in air pollution cases] 
have done far more than adjudicate disputes between private parties or prevent administrators 
from exceeding their statutory authority. They have announced sweeping rulings on policy 
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Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit has said, "would indicate 
that the prime mover behind implementation of the Clean Air Act 
has not been Congress or EPA, but the courts-specifically, this 
court. "36 The immediate impact of judicial interpretations of envi-
ronmental statutes and regulations is significant, but federal judges 
do more than affect policy development in the short run. Next to 
achieving a fundamental narrowing of a regulatory agency's enabling 
statute, the power to nominate judges with a shared vision of the 
government's appropriate role is probably a president's most effec-
issues left unresolved by existing legislation, often expanding the scope of government pro-
grams in the process." Id.; see also W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 737 (1977). 
Judicial review of agency compliance with NEPA, especially the procedural aspects, 
is consistently rigorous. Although the courts are mindful oflimitations on their powers 
to second-guess the agencies, they scarcely could be more demanding of the decision-
making process if they were sitting in nuisance cases with absolute authority to shape 
the final outcome. 
RODGERS, supra, at 737; see also Marcus, The Environmental Protection Agency, in THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION 267, 293 (J. Wilson, ed. 1980). 
In these air-pollution examples, the courts interfered with the administrator's efforts 
to carry out what he believed was a reasonable implementation strategy. They did 
not give him the right to make a trade-off he thought necessary for the purpose of 
administration. The courts also interfered with agency efforts to carry out its water-
pollution implementation strategy. 
Marcus, supra, at 293; see also F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1973); R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, supra note 
25, at 241-43 (discussing importance of private suits in monitoring administrative execution 
of environmental policy); R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA 
AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976) (documenting the judiciary's role in determining NEPA's content); 
J. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 281-
82,287-89 (1989) (discussing judiciary's influence in shaping the EPA's behavior); McCubbins, 
Noll & Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements 
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 450-68 (1989) (discussing role of 
courts in shaping policies concerning degradation of air quality in pristine regions); O'Leary, 
The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and Administration of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549 (1989); Wald, The Contribution 
of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 514-19 (1988) (Chief 
Judge Patricia M. Wald's description of the District of Columbia Circuit's formative role in 
the 1970s in reviewing implementation of new environmental protection legislation); Stewart, 
The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law Judicial Review of En-
vironmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713 (1977) 
(discussing federal judiciary's role in reviewing the federal Environmental Protection Agency's 
implementation of the Clean Air Act). 
36 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 88 n.88 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (dissenting opinion); see also 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846,848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
This court has been assigned special responsibility for determining challenges to 
EPA's air quality standards. This judicial review rests on the premise that agency 
and court "together constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest, 
and are collaborative instrumentalities of justice." This court is in a real sense part 
of the total administrative process. 
Kennecott, 462 F.2d at 848 (citation and footnote omitted). 
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tive means of ensuring that his regulatory preferences will endure 
well after his term of office has ended. 37 
The potential for the Reagan appointments to guide future judicial 
decisionmaking has attracted considerable scholarly and popular at-
tention.38 Discussions of the Reagan administration's judicial selec-
tion process often assume that virtually all Reagan appointees have 
brought conservative policy preferences to the bench.39 The impor-
tance of Reagan appointee policy preferences ultimately depends 
upon how such views shape the resolution of specific cases. 40 In a 
representative assessment of the Reagan judiciary's voting behavior, 
37 On the significance of judicial appointments to the durability of an administration's 
regulatory preferences, see Kovacic, Built to Last? The Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan 
Administration, 35 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 244, 247 (1988); Kovacic, supra note 27, at 496-97. 
Professor Peter Strauss observes that "[o]ne of the situations that faces the country today 
and may be endemic for our future is that we have a Republican presidency and a Republican 
judiciary lined up against a Democratic Congress." Administrative Law Symposium: Question 
& Answer with Professors Elliott, Strauss, and Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 551, 554. Such an 
alignment could affect significantly the future role of government intervention in controlling 
economic activity. Professor Strauss suggests, for example, that one consequence of "an 
allegiance between President and judiciary against Congress" might be the inclination of 
judges to emphasize "plain meaning approaches to statutory construction." Id. at 554; see also 
L. BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS-PROCESS AND POLICY 300 (2d ed. 1990). "[I]n general, from 
the Supreme Court to state intermediate courts, judges' preferences on individual issues and 
their general positions on the liberal-conservative spectrum go far toward determining their 
behavior on the bench .... Given enough opportunities and sufficient care, a chief executive 
can have a fundamental effect on court policies." L. BAUM, supra, at 300. 
38 See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); H. SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 32; Fowler, Judicial Selection Under Reagan and Carter: A Comparison of Their 
Initial Recommendation Procedures, 67 JUDICATURE 265 (1984); Fowler, A Comparison of 
Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection Under Reagan and Carter, 1 YALE 
L. & POL'y REV. 299 (1983); Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appoint-
ments, 68 JUDICATURE 313 (1985); Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Appointments: The Battle 
at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324 (1987); Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986); Rowland, 
Songer & Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower Federal Courts: 
The Reagan Judges, 22 L. & SOC'y REV. 191 (1988); Slotnick, Federal Judicial Recruitment 
and Selection Research: A Review Essay, 71 JUDICATURE 317 (1988); Smith, Polarization 
and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 
JUDICATURE 133 (1990); Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Ap-
pointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1987) [hereinafter All the 
President's Men?]; Pilon, Rethinking Judicial Restraint, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at AlO, 
col. 4. Skoning; Reagan Judges: Bad News for Business?, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1989, at A14, 
col. 3. 
39 See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 222. "Almost all the Reagan [judicial] appoin-
tees were conservatives who shared the president's widely expressed desire to tilt the federal 
bench to the right." Id. 
40 See Solomon, supra note 33, at 343. "The crucial question concerning the relationship of 
law and politics to the selection of federal judges is what difference the various selection 
patterns have made in the outcomes of cases." Id. 
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Professor Herman Schwartz concludes that "most recent Republican 
appointees are considerably more hostile to civil rights, economic 
regulation, and other liberal programs than their Democratic col-
leagues. "41 Some commentators claim that "conservative court 
packing"42 has yielded a significant, judicially-directed retrenchment 
of government programs to regulate business. 43 
Empirical efforts to measure the "conservative court packing" 
hypothesis in the context of cases involving economic regulation are 
rare. Typically, assessments of the Reagan judiciary rest upon an 
examination of the decisions of a handful of well-known judges.44 
Relatively few studies have attempted to evaluate the voting behav-
ior of broad segments of the Reagan judiciary in cases involving 
economic regulation, specifically cases involving environmental pol-
icy.45 This Article offers a broad empirical test of how President 
Reagan's appointments have shaped the federal judiciary's disposi-
tion of economic regulation cases. It examines voting behavior in 
environmental protection matters by comparing the votes of Presi-
dent Carter's and President Reagan's appointees in the federal 
courts of appeals, primarily in cases involving Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act issues. 46 In analyzing the voting patterns in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, cases involving 
RCRA are included to confirm the study's Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act findings. 
41 H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 8-9. 
42 Id. at 9. 
43 See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 163-89; H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 192-98. 
44 See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 222-49; H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 103-
67. 
45 For noteworthy exceptions, see Cohen, The Role of Criminal Sanctions in Antitrust 
Enforcement, CONTEMP. POL'y ISSUES, Oct. 1989, at 36 (examining determinants of judicial 
sentencing decisions in antitrust cases); Wenner, Judicial Oversight of Environmental Dere-
gulation, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980's 181 (N. Vig & M. Kraft eds. 1984) 
(examining judicial decisions involving environmental policy); Note, All the President's Men?, 
supra note 38 (examining voting behavior in selected areas of economic regulation); Stanfield, 
Out-Standing in Court, Nat'l J., Feb. 13, 1988, at 388 (discussing recent decisions governing 
standing in environmental suits); see also Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: 
Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency 
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300 (examining impact of ideological split between Carter and 
Reagan appointees upon the District of Columbia Circuit's review of administrative agency 
rules). 
46 I have compared the voting of Reagan appointees to that of Carter appointees because 
one of President Reagan's stated aims was to abandon the judicial selection philosophy that 
had animated President Carter's nominations for the federal bench. As Christopher Smith 
explains, "Clearly the Reagan administration's efforts to shape the judiciary evinced an 
intention to change the federal courts by generating different judicial outcomes than those 
produced by President Carter's Democratic appointees." Smith, supra note 38, at 133. 
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The methodology section of this Article explains the criteria used 
to select the relevant cases and to classify the individual voting 
behavior of the judges. The basic substantive distinction used 
throughout the survey is whether the judges have voted to increase 
or decrease the regulatory burdens associated with fulfilling pollution 
abatement requirements. On the whole, the Reagan judges have 
voted more "conservatively" than the Carter judges, but not by the 
dramatic margin often predicted in evaluations of the Reagan ad-
ministration's judicial selection process. One qualifying consideration 
is that disagreement among Carter and Reagan appointees sitting 
on the same panel is relatively unusual, with agreement occurring 
in close to ninety percent of all cases in which appointees of both 
presidents participated. 
The data provide qualified support for the hypothesis that Reagan 
appointees are more inclined than their Carter appointed counter-
parts to adopt positions that narrow the applications of pollution 
regulations. The apparent disparity between the Carter appointees' 
and the Reagan appointees' environmental policy preferences is most 
pronounced in the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. This sharper dichotomy between the Carter 
and Reagan appointees is reflected in the Reagan appointees' votes 
that display a greater skepticism toward the expansion of pollution 
control requirements. Preliminary evidence suggests that President 
Bush will appoint judges who share the preferences of their Reagan 
counterparts on the courts of appeals. Such a trend will give Reagan! 
Bush judges supermajorities on most circuits by the end of 1992, 
thus increasing the likelihood of burden-reducing outcomes in indi-
vidual cases and in en banc proceedings. Continued appointment of 
judges with narrow regulatory preferences also would serve to offset 
the effects of the Bush administration's selection of more aggressive 
leadership to head federal regulatory bodies such as the EPA. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Published studies of Reagan-era judicial decisionmaking in envi-
ronmental law cases can be divided into four categories. The first 
and largest category consists of surveys that examine noteworthy 
environmental decisions for a single year or a period of years.47 The 
47 See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, THE YEAR IN REVIEW: 1988, at 135-248 (1989) (discussing, inter alia, environmental 
case law developments in the federal courts); Goldsmith & Banks, Environmental Values: 
Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1983) 
(discussing trends in Supreme Court analysis of environmental issues under NEPA, the Clean 
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second category contains evaluations of individual significant cases. 48 
The third group includes analyses of trends in judicial treatment of 
specific environmental issues, such as the standing of private parties 
in environmental enforcement actions. 49 The final category details 
the environmental policy jurisprudence of individual Reagan appoin-
tees to the federal bench. 50 In these studies, the evaluations of voting 
behavior by Reagan appointees feature discussions of selected cases 
rather than a comprehensive examination of all relevant decisions. 
In order to assess the environmental policy significance of Presi-
dent Reagan's appointments to the federal judiciary in a more com-
prehensive manner, this study takes an approach that differs from 
other studies. This Article evaluates Reagan appointee voting be-' 
havior on the federal courts of appeals by comparing the decisions 
of Reagan appointees to those of judges selected by President 
Carter. Rather than focusing on a small number of prominent cases, 
this paper affords a more complete perspective on voting behavior .. 
This study reviews all the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act cases 
in which a Carter or Reagan appointee participated. This compre-
hensive survey of relevant decisio:ls provides a fuller portrait of the 
Reagan judiciary's environmental policy voting tendencies. Specifi-
cally, this study facilitates the reader's assessment of whether Rea-
gan appointees as a group tend to share the conservative, deregu-
latory preferences commonly associated with the notable appeals 
court appointees such as Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas 
Ginsburg, Alex Kozinski, Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia, and Ralph 
Winter. 
A. Selection of Cases 
To compare the voting behavior of Carter and Reagan appointees 
on the courts of appeals, this study focused upon two subsets of 
Air Act, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act); Comment, The Supreme Court: The 
1985-1986 Term in Review and a Look Ahead, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,325 (Nov. 1986) 
(analyzing Supreme Court environmental law decisions for the 1985-1986 term). 
48 For example, many commentators have analyzed the Supreme Court's decision in Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) to endorse the 
EPA's use of a "bubble" concept in regions designated as non-attainment areas under the 
Clean Air Act. See Landau, Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to 
Burst EPA's Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL. L. 285 (1985); Starr, Sunstein, Willard & Morrison, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353 
(1987) (panel discussion moderated by R. Levin). 
49 See, e.g., Stanfield, supra note 45 (discussing how Reagan-appointed judges have dealt 
with standing issues in environmental law cases). 
50 See, e.g., Comment, Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law, and the Supreme 
Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135 (1987) (discussing Justice Scalia's treatment of 
standing issues during his tenure as a member of the District of Columbia Circuit). 
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environmental law decisions: cases involving the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act. A three-step selection process was used to 
identify relevant cases for examination. 
1. Judges 
A complete listing of all Carter and Reagan appointees to the 
federal courts of appeals was assembled. 51 This roster includes in-
dividuals who continue to serve as court of appeals judges, as well 
as those who subsequently left office. 52 Judges who were elevated 
from the federal district court to the court of appeals were included 
only as of the day of their confirmation to the appellate court. 53 
Judges are counted as being Carter or Reagan appointees according 
to the president who made the appointment to the court of appeals. 54 
Finally, the survey counts cases in which Carter or Reagan appoin-
tees to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
participated by designation in the decisions of the other courts of 
appeals. 55 
51 This roster was assembled by reviewing membership listings contained in each volume 
of the Federal Reporter (Second) and commercially available reference works dealing with 
the federal judiciary. See 1991 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY (A. Brownson ed. 1990); 1990 
JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY (A. Brownson ed. 1989); 1989 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY (C. 
Brownson & A. Brownson eds. 1988); 1988 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY (C. Brownson & A. 
Brownson eds. 1987). 
52 For example, the survey includes cases in which Robert Bork participated on the District 
of Columbia Circuit from his confirmation in 1982 until his resignation in 1988. Similarly, the 
survey counts cases in which Antonin Scalia participated on the District of Columbia Circuit 
from his confirmation in 1982 until he became an associate justice of the Supreme Court in 
1986. 
63 For example, Judge Bruce M. Selya was appointed to the United States District Court 
for Rhode Island in 1982 and then was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit in 1986. The survey omits votes cast by Judge Selya in First Circuit decisions 
in which Judge Selya participated by designation during his tenure on the United States 
District Court. See, e.g., United States v. Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832,833 (1st Cir. 1983). For 
the same reason, the survey excludes the vote cast by Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr. in United 
States v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992,993 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
466 U.S. 937 (1984). The Tennessee Water Quality panel included Judge Guy, a United States 
district judge appointed in 1975 by President Ford. Judge Guy was appointed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by President Reagan in 1985. 
54 For example, Judge Juan R. Torruella was appointed to the United States District Court 
for Puerto Rico in 1974 by President Ford and then was appointed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1984 by President Reagan. Because President Reagan 
appointed him to the court of appeals, Judge Torruella is counted as a Reagan appointee. 
55 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1984) (panel including 
Judge Howard J. Markey, who was reassigned as Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, in 1982 by President Reagan). 
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2. Cases: Initial Screening 
The initial universe of court of appeals cases for study consisted 
of all cases meeting three criteria:56 (a) a Carter or Reagan appointee 
participated on the panel deciding the case;57 (b) the case involved, 
directly or indirectly, the interpretation or enforcement of abatement 
requirements under the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act;58 
and (c) the case was decided from January 20, 1977 (the date of 
President Carter's inauguration) through November 30, 1990. The 
initial search yielded a total of 290 cases meeting these criteria. 59 
3. Cases: Screening for Substantive Issues 
Following a review of the initial set of 290 cases, the list of deci-
sions for further study was restricted to matters that involved sub-
stantive Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act issues concerning stand-
ing, abatement requirements (and related liability rules), and 
remedies. Application of this criterion resulted in the omission of 
three types of decisions. 
The first group of excluded decisions was concerned, exclusively 
or chiefly, with inspection disputes, discovery problems, or proce-
dural issues that did not require the court to address standing, 
liability, or remedial standards. Omitted cases in this category in-
volved matters such as the EPA's authority to conduct on-site in-
spection or surveillance of company facilities;60 the EPA's power to 
66 Lexis and Westlaw databases were used to identify relevant cases. I am deeply indebted 
to Sean Coleman and Steven Taylor for their assistance in identifying and screening relevant 
cases. 
57 Most of the cases reviewed were decided by three-judge panels. Thus, a case decided by 
a three-judge panel was included if it contained at least one Carter or Reagan appointee. 
During the survey period, appointees of President Bush participated in three cases involving 
Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act issues. The aggregate voting statistics presented below 
include the votes cast by Bush appointees in these cases. 
58 By using this criterion, the study omits cases in which either the Clean Air Act or the 
Clean Water Act is mentioned as part of the background of a dispute whose underlying liability 
and remedial issues are predicated upon neither environmental statute. See, e.g., Luterbach 
Constr. Co. v. Adamakus, 781 F.2d 599, 600-02 (7th Cir. 1986) (bid protest action involving 
award of a contract to be performed with funds appropriated for waste water treatment 
facilities under the Clean Water Act); Pennbank v. United States, 779 F.2d 175, 176 (3d Cir. 
1985) (Federal Tort Claims Act claim alleging negligence by government authorities in con-
struction of a municipal sewer project undertaken to satisfy water quality requirements of 
the Clean Water Act); Clevepak Corp. v. EPA, 708 F.2d 137, 139-41 (4th Cir. 1983) (bid 
protest action involving award of a contract to be performed with funds appropriated for 
wastewater treatment facilities under the Clean Water Act). 
59 A complete list of the cases examined in this study is on file with the author. 
60 See, e.g., Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 505-06 (5th Cir. 1987) (resolving allegations 
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obtain access to company records;61 deadlines for filing challenges to 
conditions embodied in discharge permits;62 Freedom of Information 
Act requests;63 determinations of venue in cases of multiple, simul-
taneous filings to attack proposed EPA rules;64 issuance of protective 
orders;65 replacement costs associated with installation of facilities 
mandated by the Clean Water Act;66 dismissals of challenges to EPA 
enforcement initiatives based upon the absence of reviewable final 
agency action;67 and the preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act upon 
state statutes governing the sale of gray-market automobiles. 68 
that EPA officials investigating Clean Air Act violations conducted warrantless search of 
gasoline station and seized gasoline samples and records without the owner's consent); Dow 
Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1985) 
(action by chemical company to enjoin the EPA from conducting aerial surveillance and 
photography to detect possible Clean Air Act violations); Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 
1187, 1188 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding the EPA's authority to collect samples from streams of 
industrial waste); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1981) (suit over the 
EPA's right to enforce warrant to inspect industrial facility pursuant to the Clean Air Act); 
Stauffer Chern. Co. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075, 1075-77 (10th Cir. 1981) (motion to quash admin-
istrative search warrant authorizing the EPA to inspect premises of an emission source). 
61 See, e.g., CED's Inc. v. EPA, 745 F.2d 1092,1094 (7th Cir. 1984) (involving scope of the 
EPA's authority to copy company records under the Clean Air Act), cen. denied, 471 U.S. 
1015 (1985). 
62 See, e.g., Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 799 F.2d 173, 173 (5th Cir. 1986) (untimely 
filing of petition for review of EPA decision establishing conditions for National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System permit). 
63 See, e.g., Brant Constr. Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258, 1260 (7th Cir. 1985) (Freedom of 
Information Act request for unsolicited letters the EPA received concerning allegations of 
illegal conduct by a contractor building waste treatment facilities with an EPA grant funded 
under title II of the Clean Water Act). 
64 See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 534, 536-37 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(determining proper venue for petitions for judicial review of EPA regulations governing, 
inter alia, discharge permit program under the Clean Water Act); Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. EPA, 673 F.2d 392, 394-95 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same issue as in Virginia Elec. & 
Power). 
65 See, e.g., New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 801 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(affirming, in Clean Air Act case, issuance of protective order that temporarily barred public 
release of state government report on emissions). 
66 See Consumers Power Co. v. Costle, 615 F.2d 1147, 1148 (6th Cir. 1980) (action by power 
company to recover costs incurred in replacing gas mains relocated to accommodate construc-
tion of waste water and sewer projects funded under title II of the Clean Water Act). 
67 See Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); Greater Cincinnati 
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 879 F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (6th Cir. 1989); Solar Turbines, Inc. 
v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989); Pacificorp v. Thomas, 883 F.2d 661, 661 (9th Cir. 
1988). . 
68 See, e.g., Sims v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 
1455 (11th Cir. 1989) (Florida statute governing gray market automobile imports deemed 
preempted by the Clean Air Act); Direct Auto. Imports Ass'n v. Townsley, 804 F.2d 1408, 
1409 (5th Cir. 1986) (action involving preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act upon Texas 
statute regulating gray market automobiles). 
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The second category of excluded cases consisted of decisions in 
which Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act claims were pursued in 
conjunction with claims based upon other environmental protection 
statutes. Certain types of conduct--for example, a company's dis-
charge of hazardous material into a river-can expose the facility 
owner to liability under two or more environmental protection stat-
utes. This survey omits decisions in which the plaintiff pled Clean 
Air Act or Clean Water Act claims, but the court's ruling was based 
on the application of a related statute such as RCRA 69 or the En-
dangered Species Act. 70 
The final group of omitted cases involved the disposition of NEP A 
claims arising from the government's performance of duties imposed 
by the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. The survey excludes 
decisions involving the application of NEPA's environmental impact 
statement requirements to the construction of water treatment fa-
cilities funded under the Clean Water Act,71 the issuance of dredging 
permits by the Army Corps of Engineers,72 and the site preparation 
activities for the construction of a Department of Energy nuclear 
power plant. 73 
Of the 290 cases initially identified as potential candidates for 
study, 49 were excluded by applying the screening criteria described 
above. The remaining 241 cases provided the basis for the findings 
reported in Section IV below. 
B. Classification of Decisions 
To compare the voting records of Carter and Reagan court of 
appeals judges, the study classifies the outcomes of Clean Air Act 
and Clean Water Act decisions according to their consistency with 
the Reagan regulatory reform agenda. The study places relevant 
decisions in one of three categories: decisions that increase the reg-
69 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(interpreting RCRA requirements in context of suit alleging violations of RCRA and the 
Clean Water Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (l985). 
70 See, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 514 (lOth Cir. 1985) (ruling 
based chiefly upon application of Endangered Species Act). 
71 See Simons v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1983) (NEPA claim arising from 
construction of municipal sewage treatment plant funded by a federal grant under title II of 
the Clean Water Act). 
72 See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 1985) (NEPA suit challenging Army 
Corps of Engineers' renewal of shell dredging permits required under the Clean Water Act). 
73 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Zeller, 688 F.2d 706, 707 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(NEPA suit challenging commencement of site preparation activities for construction of a 
Department of Energy breeder reactor facility). 
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ulatory burdens of affected actors, decisions that reduce the regu-
latory burdens of affected actors, and decisions in which the impact 
on the overall regulatory burden borne by the party with an abate-
ment obligation is neutral. 74 The content of these categories is de-
scribed in detail below. 
1. Greater Regulatory Burden 
The federal courts of appeals can take a number of approaches 
toward increasing the burdens associated with Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act compliance. Courts can be said to increase the 
burdens associated with Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act com-
pliance when they: 
(a) sustain challenges to proposed EPA rules or other EPA poli-
cymaking initiatives that take a comparatively narrow view of com-
pliance obligations under the enabling statutes;75 
(b) reject claims that the EPA or other government agencies have 
adopted impermissibly expansive interpretations of compliance re-
quirements under the enabling statutes;76 
(c) uphold EPA or state government refusals to grant extensions 
to abatement timetables;77 
74 In most of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act cases reviewed for this survey, the 
affected entity is a business. State and municipal governments, however, also face abatement 
requirements under the statutes and therefore are treated as affected parties. 
75 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1322-24 (9th Cir. 
1990) (remanding final EPA rule because the EPA had erred in its narrow interpretation of 
the Clean Water Act's requirements governing identification of point sources); Delaney v. 
EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 695 (9th Cir. 1990) (vacating EPA approval of Clean Air Act implemen-
tation plans); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 315-16 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(upholding challenge to the EPA's discharge "removal credit" rule on ground that rule's 
standards were too lenient). 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Foil Prods., 889 F.2d 1513, 1520-21 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting argument that the EPA is precluded from bringing an enforcement action against 
a polluter allegedly complying with proposed revised state implementation plan that the EPA 
has yet to endorse); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 266 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting 
industry attacks upon the EPA's cost analysis for determining best practicable technology 
under Clean Water Act); Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnerships v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782,792, 
795 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting developer's claim that the EPA exceeded its authority by 
imposing non-point source abatement conditions in grant of sewage treatment funds to mu-
nicipality); Reynolds Metals Co. v. EPA, 760 F.2d 549, 566-67 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejecting 
industry claim that the EPA underestimated cost of abatement requirements); National Ass'n 
of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 663-65 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting challenges to EPA 
pretreatment regulations, including claims that the EPA had failed to undertake proper cost-
benefit assessment of specific pretreatment requirements), rev'd, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Wis-
consin Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying petition for review of 
the EPA's decision to designate a nonattainment area). 
77 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 738 F.2d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1984) (rejecting claim 
that the EPA abused its discretion by refusing to initiate rulemaking to extend deadline for 
compliance with pretreatment standards). 
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(d) oppose EPA consideration of cost-benefit trade-offs in estab-
lishing abatement standards;78 
(e) invalidate EPA experiments with market-based economic in-
centives to achieve existing abatement goals at lower overall cost;79 
(f) reduce standing and other jurisdictional or procedural barriers 
for private parties seeking to vindicate statutory and regulatory 
abatement requirements;80 
(g) approve generous damage recoveries or injunctions to private 
or public parties who prove violations of abatement requirements;81 
and 
(h) reject burdensome standards of proof in determining the en-
titlement of private plaintiffs to attorneys' fees and in setting the 
amount of such fees. 82 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1087 (3d Cir. 
1987) (rejecting economic infeasibility as basis for staying compliance with Clean Air Act). A 
burden-increasing approach also would consist of rejecting industry arguments that EPA cost-
benefit assessments understated the costs associated with specific abatement standards. See 
Project, The Impact of Cost-Benefit Analysis on Federal Administrative Law, 42 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 545, 609 (1990). 
79 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (rejecting EPA interpretation of "source" to refer to entire plant as part of EPA effort 
to employ bubble concept), rev'd sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
80 See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 
64, 73 (3d Cir. 1990) (environmental organizations satisfied requirements for representational 
standing to pursue Clean Water Act citizen suit); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1134 (11th Cir. 1990) (citizen suit plaintiffs may request injunctive 
relief and civil penalties for ongoing violations of Clean Water Act discharge permit); Sierra 
Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517,1522-23 (9th Cir. 1987) (federal five-year statute 
of limitations, not state's three-year statute of limitations, governs Clean Water Act citizen 
enforcement actions); Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 
304, 308 (4th Cir. 1986) (citizen suits brought under section 505 of the Clean Water Act may 
be based on alleged past violations of discharge permit), vacated, 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Friends 
of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57,61 (2d Cir. 1985) (non-profit corporation's 
allegation of injury to aesthetic well-being established standing to challenge violation of Clean 
Water Act discharge permit; concurrent administrative enforcement actions against and con-
sent agreements with defendants did not preclude filing citizen suits under § 505(b)(I)(B) of 
the Clean Water Act). 
81 See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350,1352, 1356 
(9th Cir. 1990) (upholding consent judgment requiring defendant to pay $45,000 to environ-
mental groups to maintain and protect water quality); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 
847 F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding trial court's computation of $977,000 in civil 
penalties), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3185 (1989); Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Philadel-
phia Water Dep't, 843 F.2d 679, 682 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding civil contempt citation for 
violation of injunction compelling compliance with Clean Air Act state implementation plan 
despite failure of citizens' group to provide evidence of actual losses); Duquesne Light Co. v. 
EPA, 791 F.2d 959, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding EPA regulations under the Clean Air Act 
for calculating noncompliance penalties); Hudson Stations, Inc. v. EPA, 642 F.2d 261,264 (8th 
Cir. 1981) (upholding the EPA's methodology in calculating civil penalty). 
82 See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313,315 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming 
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This study classifies decisions that take one or more of these 
positions as "burden-increasing." Accordingly, the votes of individual 
judges who endorse burden-increasing outcomes are treated as con-
trary to the Reagan regulatory reform program. 
2. Lesser Regulatory Burden 
Decisions reducing the regulatory burden of affected companies 
reflect positions that are essentially mirror images of the burden-
increasing positions outlined above. To reduce an environmental 
regulatory burden a court of appeals might: 
(a) uphold EPA rules or other regulatory commands that narrowly 
interpret compliance obligations under the Clean Air and Clean 
Water statutes;83 
(b) sustain EPA efforts to set abatement obligations by recourse 
to cost-benefit assessments that measure incremental pollution re-
ductions against the cost of attaining them;84 
(c) approve industry or state requests for extensions of timetables 
for achieving emission control targets;85 
award of attorneys' fees to environmental groups); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean 
Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 276-78 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding, inter alia, award of fees 
to citizens' group including fees for work performed after entry of consent decree and work 
done by citizens' group's in-house counsel), aff'd in part, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), rev'd in part, 
483 U.S. 711 (1987); Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 670 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 
1982) (approving award of attorneys' fees to non-prevailing party under the Clean Air Act), 
vacated, 464 U.S. 806 (1983). 
83 See, e.g., Vermont v. Thomas, 850 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the EPA's 
refusal to approve state implementation plan provisions designed to reduce "regional haze"); 
New York v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting challenge to EPA decision 
approving modification of state implementation plan to permit power station to increase 
sulphur dioxide emissions); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d 1200,1204-05 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting 
State of New York's claim that the EPA endorsed lenient emissions standard in approving 
State of Tennessee's state implementation plan); Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 224 (lst 
Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA regional administrator's decision that diesel engines to be installed 
in cogeneration plant owned by nonprofit health and education institution are exempt from 
Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality Requirements); Citizens 
Against the Refinery's Effects, Inc. v. EPA, 643 F.2d 178, 179 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting 
citizens' group challenge to EPA determination that refinery'S operation would not cause 
significant deterioration of air quality). 
84 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (allowing the EPA to consider factors of cost and technical feasibility in setting emissions 
standards that will provide an ample margin of safety for toxic air pollutants). 
85 See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for Environment, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1006-07 (2d 
Cir.) (rejecting argument that the EPA's conditional approval of state implementation plan 
constituted impermissible modification of the Clean Air Act's abatement deadlines), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1035 (1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 651 F.2d 861, 868-69 (3d Cir. 
1981) (sustaining steel company challenge to the EPA's rejection of delayed compliance order 
issued by state department of environmental resources). 
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(d) approve industry or state claims that EPA has asserted broad, 
unsupportable interpretations of statutory or regulatory abatement 
requirements;86 
(e) apply strict standing screens and impose other jurisdictional 
or procedural hurdles to limit the ability of private parties (including 
pro-abatement environmental groups) to challenge apparent devia-
tions from statutory and regulatory pollution control requirements;87 
(f) interpret Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act remedial provi-
sions narrowly to reduce company exposure to damages for violations 
of the statutes;88 and 
(g) apply strict standards in determining the eligibility of private 
plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and in setting the amount of such 
awards. 89 
86 See, e.g., Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 775 F.2d 1141, 1151 (7th Cir. 
1985) (remanding EPA decision denying redesignation of two Illinois counties from nonattain-
ment to attainment areas); United States v. Fort Pierce, 747 F.2d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting Army Corps of Engineers' efforts to assert violations of Clean Water Act wetlands 
provisions); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 401 (6th Cir. 
1984) (holding that Clean Water Act limits on use of wetlands did not apply to certain tracts 
of undeveloped land), rev'd, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 
634 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding chemical manufacturer's claim that the EPA improperly applied 
new source performance standards for fossil fuel steam generating units to the firm's waste 
heat boilers); Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding the EPA's order 
that plant owner install a sampling station in one of its stacks arbitrary and capricious). 
87 See, e.g., Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 644 (11th Cir. 
1990) (rejecting citizen suit jurisdiction based upon implied cause of action under supremacy 
clause); Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding dismissal of citizen suit 
claim based on § 7604 of Clean Air Act for failure to allege specific violation of an existing 
state implementation plan), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989); California v. Department of 
the Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 224-25 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that Clean Water Act citizen suit 
provision does not confer standing on state government to seek civil penalties); DuBois v. 
Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 951 (8th Cir. 1987) (dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
citizen suit that challenged the EPA's failure to exercise its discretionary duties); Sierra Club 
v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.) (holding that Clean Water Act's citizen suit 
provision may be invoked only by plaintiffs who allege ongoing violations), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 985 (1987); Atlantic City Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Regional Adm'r, 803 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (finding lack of citizen suit jurisdiction due to absence of nondiscretionary EPA 
authority that plaintiff sought to enforce); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 107 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (denying citizen suit standing to environmental organization on ground that orga-
nization failed to allege injury in fact from discharge of pollutants); see also National Audubon 
Soc'y v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal common law 
nuisance suit deemed preempted by Clean Water Act). 
88 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 906 F.2d 
934, 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to grant permanent injunction on ground that proof of past 
violations of water pollution discharge permit failed to establish irreparable harm); American 
Cyanamid Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1988) (barring the EPA from imposing 
noncompliance penalties for four-month period between state's submission of proposed revision 
to state implementation plan and date the EPA rejected proposed revision). 
89 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 801 F.2d 457, 462 (D.C. Cir. 
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This study classifies decisions that employ one or more of these 
approaches as "burden-reducing." Thus, the vote of an indiviclual 
judge that supports a burden-reducing outcome is treated as consis-
tent with Reagan regulatory reform objectives. 
3. Neutral Impact on Regulatory Burden 
Some cases examined in this survey do not affect the overall size 
of the regulatory burden, but instead determine which of the affected 
parties will bear the cost of achieving existing abatement targets. 
For example, several decisions involve disputes between neighbor-
ing municipalities over which municipality will shoulder the financial 
and aesthetic burdens associated with meeting Clean Water Act 
sewage treatment and discharge requirements. 9o These and other 
decisions affect the distribution of wealth among different polluting 
parties, but they neither increase nor decrease total abatement ob-
ligations. This study classifies individual votes in these decisions as 
being "neutral" with respect to the accomplishment of Reagan reg-
ulatory reform goals. 
The survey applies the neutral characterization to one other type 
of vote. In three cases, the court equally rejected industry and 
environmental group challenges to EPA decisions. 91 In each instance, 
the industry attacked the EPA decision as excessively burdensome, 
and the environmental group contended that the agency's chosen 
abatement obligation was too lenient. Because the court endorsed 
the EPA's action without qualification, votes by Carter and Reagan 
appointees in these matters are treated as neutral. 
1986) (rejecting environmental group's request that attorneys' fees be assessed against indus-
try intervenors); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631, 632 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(ruling that the Clean Water Act does not authorize fee awards against the government for 
expenses the plaintiff incurred in litigating issues on which the government prevailed or in 
parts of the litigation opposed only by other, nongovernmental parties); United States v. 
National Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 62, 64 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying environmental group intervenor's 
application for attorneys' fees on ground that the EPA was diligently prosecuting Clean Air 
Act case). 
90 See, e.g., Mumford Cove Ass'n v. Town of Groton, 786 F.2d 530, 531 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(motion by two cities to intervene in a dispute concerning construction of sewage discharge 
facilities). 
91 E.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1986); American 
Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Natural Resources Defense 
Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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4. Accounting for the Role of Judicial Review of Agency 
Decisionmaking 
691 
Although its exact boundaries are indistinct, the requirement that 
appellate courts defer to certain administrative agency interpreta-
tions and policy decisions is a basic foundation of modern adminis-
trative law. 92 In principle, the deference requirement bars an appel-
late judge from upsetting agency interpretations or policy choices 
on the ground that the agency's view collides with the judge's own 
policy preferences. 93 In practice, a judge enjoys considerable discre-
tion to apply a nominal deference standard to endorse policy choices 
she approves and to overturn those she disfavors. 94 Thus, the amount 
92 For general treatments of the scope of review in administrative law matters, see Breyer, 
Judicial Review oj Q'uestions oj Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 382-97 (1986); 
Levin, Scope-oj-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 239, 242-90 (1986). Environmental law decisions involving the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act have provided important vehicles for the development of modern scope of 
review doctrine. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (identifying circumstances in which reviewing courts should defer to 
agency interpretations of statutes that the agencies in question administer). For a recent, 
extensive treatment of Chevron's doctrinal significance and practical effects, see Anthony, 
Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 
16-42 (1990). 
93 See, e.g., Arkansas Poultry Fed'n v. EPA, 852 F.2d 324,325 (8th Cir. 1988). "We must 
defer to any reasonable interpretation given the statute by the agency charged with its 
administration. . . . 'Great deference' is especially appropriate when a 'complex' statute like 
the [Clean Water] Act is at issue." Id. (citations omitted); see also Vermont v. Thomas, 850 
F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1988). "[I]n view of the EPA's responsibility to administer the Clean Air 
Act, we must give great deference to the Administrator's interpretation of the statute." Id. 
(citations omitted); see also Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445,447-48 (4th Cir. 1985). "We may 
not overturn the agency's judgment simply because we might have drafted different regula-
tions; remand is limited to cases in which the agency has acted without reasonable basis." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
94 R. Melnick's comprehensive study of the courts' role in overseeing implementation of the 
Clean Air Act skillfully documents the extensive discretion appellate judges enjoy to override 
EPA policy decisions while asserting fidelity to a limited standard of review. See R. MELNICK, 
supra note 2, at 11-18. Professor Melnick states that 
the courts have become increasingly willing to second-guess agencies on their reading 
of statutes and their interpretation of evidence--especially when they fear the agency 
lacks aggressiveness in pursuing its statutory mission. While claiming not to substi-
tute their opinions for those of the administrator, judges frequently disagree with 
agencies on the meaning of statutory terms and insist upon an expansive reading of 
"nondiscretionary duties." 
See id. at 11; see also O'Leary, supra note 35, at 569. 
[I]ndividual judicial personalities are partially responsible for the negative effects of 
federal court decisions on the EPA. In some instances judges have overstepped their 
statutory bounds to force change in the agency. In other instances judges with no 
scientific background have questioned the scientific expertise of EPA staff. In yet 
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of deference given to any single agency decision can vary directly 
with the agency's fidelity to the collective policy preferences of a 
reviewing panel on the court of appeals. 95 
In most respects, the exact contours of the standard of review are 
unimportant to the hypothesis being tested in this survey-that 
Reagan judges are more inclined than their Carter counterparts to 
embrace positions that reduce regulatory burdens under the Clean 
Air Act and the Clean Water Act. If Reagan judges are ideologically 
committed to the reduction of compliance burdens and if Carter 
judges are ideologically predisposed to the expansion of abatement 
obligations, then the existence of a nominally deferential standard 
of review will act as only a minor inhibition on the tendency of judges 
to evaluate agency decisions according to the judge's political pref-
erences. The more confident the judge is that the agency's policy-
making choices mimic her own preferences, the more willing she will 
be to defer to its policy decisions. Thus, if Reagan judges are truly 
committed to reducing pollution abatement obligations, their votes 
will tend to favor challenges to EPA rules that increase abatement 
burdens. Similarly, if Carter judges are predisposed to favor more 
stringent pollution controls, their votes will attack EPA rules that 
appear to embrace permissive abatement standards. If pro-abate-
other instances, judges have aggressively pushed EPA in a specific direction seem-
ingly based on their own personal biases. 
O'Leary, supra note 35, at 569. 
Perceived instances of manipulation of the deference requirement sometimes have provoked 
disputes between Carter and Reagan appointees in the surveyed cases. In Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1990), for example, a three-judge panel 
divided sharply over whether to compel the EPA to explain its decision not to initiate a 
rulemaking under the Clean Air Act concerning a secondary standard protecting against acid 
rain. A plurality including two Carter appointees, Judges Patricia Wald and Harry Edwards, 
ordered the EPA to explain its inaction after concluding that the EPA's failure to initiate 
rulemaking constituted final agency action and thus gave the court jurisdiction to review a 
petition challenging the EPA's conduct. 902 F.2d at 980. Chief Judge Wald's separate opinion 
concluded that the "EPA's inaction for ten years beyond the statutory deadline is effectively 
a final decision not to revise" and supported the remand requiring the agency to provide the 
court with "clear and cogent reasons why it has taken no action vis-a.-vis an acid deposition 
standard." [d. at 988. Judge Silberman, a Reagan appointee, dissented from the decision to 
remand, disputing the plurality's conclusion that the EPA had made a final decision concerning 
acid deposition. [d. at 995 (Silberman, J., dissenting). Judge Silberman observed: 
The picture that emerges from the record is not one of an agency sleeping on a 
serious public welfare problem but that of an agency moving, albeit slowly, towards 
a final decision. Until that time, even under the Chief Judge's reasoning, we are 
without jurisdiction to second-guess either the pace or outcome of that decision. 
[d. at 998 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
95 See Pierce, supra note 45, at 302 (discussing role of political ideology in shaping review 
of administrative agency decisions by Carter and Reagan judges on the District of Columbia 
Circuit). 
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ment or anti-abatement ideology genuinely dominates a judge's vot-
ing, the survey assumes that the content of the agency's decision 
will govern the degree of deference actually given individual cases. 
In effect, the conservative court packing hypothesis posits that Rea-
gan judges will defer to EPA's policy choices only when EPA adopts 
burden-reducing positions. 
This survey has not attempted systematically to measure the ex-
tent to which the requirement of judicial deference has inhibited 
Carter and Reagan appointees in giving effect to pro-abatement or 
anti-abatement preferences when an EPA decision contradicts those 
preferences. The cases do provide, however, no basis for assuming 
that Reagan judges invariably will set aside EPA policy judgments 
to reach anti-abatement outcomes. Parties seeking to weaken or 
avoid abatement obligations embodied in EPA regulations can not 
presume that Reagan-judge dominated panels will withhold defer-
ence in evaluating the agency's choice of abatement levels. 96 Even 
96 Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990) demonstrates this point. In Rybachek, 
an Alaskan mining association and individual miners attacked EPA regulations promulgated 
under the Clean Water Act. A Ninth Circuit panel of three Reagan appointees (Diarmuid 
O'Scannlain, Edward Leavy, and Stephen Trott) upheld the EPA regulation, frequently 
emphasizing the appellate court's limited scope of review. Id. at 1284-86. 
Judge O'Scannlain's opinion for the court observed that 
[b]ecause the EPA has been charged with administering the Clean Water Act, we 
must show great deference to the Agency's interpretation of the Act. We especially 
defer where the Agency's decision on the meaning or reach of the Clean Water Act 
involves reconciling conflicting policies committed to the Agency's care and expertise 
under the Act. 
Id. at 1284 (citations omitted). The court acknowledged the EPA's broad discretion in consid-
ering the costs and benefits of an abatement technology in determining whether the technology 
is the best practicable technology currently available. Id. at 1289. 
This point also is illustrated by American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 
1988). In American Petroleum, a three-judge panel, including Reagan appointees W. Eugene 
Davis and Jerry Smith, denied a trade association petition challenging the EPA's issuance of 
permits controlling the discharge of pollutants from certain offshore drilling rigs. Id. at 263. 
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Smith said, "[W]e review deferentially not only EPA's 
factual evaluations, but also its statutory and regulatory interpretation and application, and 
its policy determinations." Id. In endorsing the EPA's choice of best available technology 
limitations, Judge Smith explained "we here affirm the agency's enforcement of its mandate 
pursuant to Congress's legislative policy determination. In this regard, we must be ever 
cognizant that '[w]e are judges, not legislators.'" Id. at 265 n.6 (citation omitted). 
A third case demonstrating this point is Riverside Cement Co. v. Thomas, 843 F.2d 1246 
(9th Cir. 1988), which was decided by a three-judge panel, including Reagan appointees John 
Noonan and David Thompson. Judge Noonan's majority opinion upheld a challenge to an EPA 
decision to issue a rule that approved a revised state implementation plan but omitted a state-
approved condition making application of the plan's abatement requirements contingent upon 
the results of further fact-finding. Id. at 1247-48. Judge Thompson dissented on the ground 
that the EPA's decision to omit the condition rested upon a reasonable interpretation of the 
EPA's powers under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 1250 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Judge Thomp-
694 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:669 
individual Reagan judges who are seen by some commentators as 
the epitome of conservative court packing efforts have rejected in-
dustry challenges to EPA abatement requirements. In his critique 
of the Reagan administration's judicial selections, Herman Schwartz 
cites Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson as an example of the "very conser-
vative academics" whose appointment "ensures an aggressive, un-
compromising conservatism that is willing to shake up and over-
turn."97 Yet Judge Wilkinson's opinion for the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Kennecott v. EPA98 firmly resisted the peti-
tioner's invitation to second-guess EPA's choice of certain effluent 
limits. Judge Wilkinson observed that "this court is bound by the 
general rules of deference that run throughout administrative law. 
We may not overturn the agency's judgment simply because we 
might have drafted different regulations; remand is limited to those 
cases in which the agency has acted without reasonable basis. "99 
After examining and rejecting the petitioner's objections to the ef-
_ fluent restrictions, Judge Wilkinson noted that "[t]he technical in-
tricacy of the judgments at issue reminds us again of the constraints 
and limitations of judicial review and the heavy obligations imposed 
upon agency specialists to bring to their tasks a sense of fairness as 
well as a briefcase of expertise. "100 
Judge Wilkinson's opinion in Kennecott suggests that one element 
of the conservatism attributed to Reagan appointees may be a pru-
dent judicial unWillingness to engage in policymaking functions for 
which the courts are institutionally ill-suited. This is particularly 
true for the technically complex fact-finding and analysis decisions 
that dominate EPA's agenda. 101 A second possible explanation for a 
son observed: "EPA's interpretation is reasonable. And it is entitled to deference .... By 
choosing to adopt the cement companies' interpretation over the EPA's, the majority is 
substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency charged with administering 
the Clean Air Act." [d. at 1250 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
97 H. SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 70. 
98 780 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1985). 
99 [d. at 447-48 (citation omitted). 
100 [d. at 461. 
101 To respect an agency's comparative advantage in certain policymaking tasks is not to 
assume that the agency's judgments are routinely flawless or well motivated. Judge Wilkin-
son's Kennecott opinion, for example, cautions that the court is not "blind to the capacities of 
agencies to enthrone their own agendas and dismiss contending views." [d. at 448. While 
acknowledging the possibility of such distortions, Judge Wilkinson emphasized that the court 
of appeals' proper function in examining the policy choices underlying EPA's rules consists 
solely of determining whether such choices had reasonable bases. [d. at 447-48. 
Even though a judge might find an agency's technical policy choices suspect, the same judge 
might defer to the agency rather than engage in an independent reevaluation of complex 
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Reagan judge's willingness to defer is confidence that government 
agencies under the leadership of other Reagan appointees are likely 
to exercise their regulatory powers wisely. This proposition may 
help explain the tendency of Reagan judges, such as Robert Bork 
and Richard Posner, to defer to regulatory agencies on the same 
types of enforcement decisions that they earlier had criticized in 
their academic writings. 102 By emphasizing the commitment to ap-
point conservative officials to lead federal regulatory agencies, the 
Reagan administration may have persuaded its judicial appointees 
information that could yield an equally flawed, or even more harmful, policy result. Wise 
judges know their own and their institution's limitations. See R. MELNICK, supra note 2, at 
60. "The scientific and engineering issues that arise in many clean air cases are enough to 
humble even the most self-confident judge." [d.; cf. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CRISIS AND REFORM 208 (1985) (advocating judicial self-restraint that entails "the judge's 
trying to limit his court's power over other government institutions. If he is a federal judge 
he will want federal courts to pay greater deference to decisions of Congress, of the federal 
administrative agencies, of the executive branch, and of all branches and levels of state 
government"). 
102 Before their appointments to the federal bench, Judges Bork and Posner had harshly 
criticized the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) performance as an antitrust enforcement 
agency. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 48,252 
(1978); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47, 54-61 (1969). 
However, as judges on the District of Columbia Circuit and Seventh Circuit respectively, 
Judges Bork and Posner have sustained the FTC's enforcement position in all three antitrust 
matters reviewed by panels on which they participated. In two cases, Judges Bork and Posner 
authored majority opinions sustaining lower courts' decisions to grant the FTC's request for 
preliminary injunctions to bar anticompetitive mergers. FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 
901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In 
the third case, Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion sustaining an FTC administrative 
decision that compelled the dissolution of a merger involving rival hospital corporations. 
Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1393 (7th Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 481 U.S. 
1038 (1987). Judge Posner's opinion emphasized the deferential nature of the court's review 
of the FTC's evaluation of the evidence and praised the painstaking quality of the FTC's 
analysis. 807 F.2d at 1384-86. Beyond their assessment of the merits in each case, it is 
conceivable that Judges Bork and Posner regarded the FTC's position somewhat more favor-
ably because the decision to prosecute had been made by Reagan appointees who had com-
mitted the FTC to a retrenchment of antitrust enforcement approaches that had prevailed in 
the 1970s. See Kovacic, Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two 
Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 RES. IN 
L. & ECON. 173, 177-78 (1989) (discussing Reagan administration antitrust policies); Kovacic, 
supra note 27, at 477-80 (describing Reagan FTC's antitrust agenda and intended departure 
from enforcement approaches of 1970s). 
In another context, however, Judge Posner has suggested that such deference is simply a 
consequence of a judge's exercising "structural restraint" in reviewing decisions of other 
government bodies. See R. POSNER, supra note 101, at 208-09. 
Structural restraint is not a liberal or a conservative position, because it is indepen-
dent of the policies that the other institutions of government happen to be following. 
It will produce liberal or conservative outcomes depending on whether the courts in 
question are at the moment more or less liberal than those institutions. 
[d. (citation omitted). 
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that such agencies would promulgate "reasonable" abatement re-
quirements. By disavowing the intervention-oriented "excesses" of 
previous agency leadership, the Reagan regulatory appointees also 
could be said to be signalling to reviewing courts that the rules or 
enforcement actions they did pursue were designed to stop only the 
most egregious conduct. 103 
A review of the cases in this survey provides qualitative support 
for the view that the judicial deference does exercise a moderating 
influence on judges at both ends of the ideological spectrum. N one-
theless, judges retain substantial discretion to determine what im-
pact deference will have in a particular case. If conservative court 
packing truly entails a judicially imposed reduction of regulatory 
burdens, one can assume that Reagan appointees will be inclined to 
use that discretion to uphold attacks on EPA's abatement commands, 
and that Carter appointees will be inclined to use their discretion to 
see that EPA abatement commands are upheld or strengthened. The 
data on the voting patterns will reflect the intensity of these poten-
tially different perspectives. 
IV. SURVEY RESULTS 
The 241 Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act cases decided from 
January 1977 through November 1990 were analyzed from three 
perspectives. 104 The first analysis considers all votes cast by Carter 
and Reagan appointees, determining how frequently Carter judges 
and Reagan judges embraced positions that were burden-increasing 
and burden-reducing respectively. The second analysis considers 
cases in which either a Carter appointee or a Reagan appointee 
authored the majority opinion. The third perspective considers cases 
in which at least one Carter appointee and at least one Reagan 
appointee sat on the panel. 
103 It is reasonable to assume that many court of appeals judges are aware of the enforce-
ment policy shifts that accompany changes in administration. Such adjustments would be 
evident in general news accounts, trade publications, academic journals, and speeches before 
bar association groups or other professional gatherings frequented by judges. In announcing 
a retrenchment of enforcement plans, a regulatory agency head can be said to be sending the 
following message to conservative judges that review the agency's decisions: "We have nar-
rowed the focus of our enforcement efforts. When we act, you can be confident that we are 
seeking to correct unambiguously dangerous conduct." 
104 See supra notes 60-91 and accompanying text. 
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A. All Votes Cast by Carter and Reagan Appointees in Clean Air 
Act and Clean Water Act Cases 
In the 241 cases selected for detailed study, Carter and Reagan 
appointees cast a total of 413 votes. This figure includes all votes 
Carter and Reagan appointees cast: in majority opinions, in support 
of majority outcomes, in per curiam decisions, in concurring opinions, 
in dissenting opinions, in support of dissenting opinions, and in de-
cisions en banco These votes also include cases in which more than 
one Carter or Reagan appointee sat on the same panel. Therefore, 
if two Carter appointees participated on a panel in the same case, 
the vote of each was treated as a separate observable event. 
Carter appointees accounted for 249 of the total of 413 votes. In 
158 instances (63.5%), Carter appointees supported positions with 
burden-increasing consequences for entities whose emission and dis-
charge activities are governed by the Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act. 105 Further, in eighty-three instances (33.3%), Carter judges 
endorsed outcomes with burden-reducing effects. 106 In the remaining 
eight votes (3.2%), the Carter appointees approved outcomes whose 
impact on compliance burdens was neutral. 107 
In the same cases, Reagan appointees cast a total of 164 votes. In 
eighty-five of these votes (51.8%), Reagan appointees supported 
burden-increasing outcomes. In seventy-five instances (45.7%), Rea-
gan judges endorsed burden-reducing outcomes. In four votes 
(2.5%), the Reagan appointees approved outcomes with burden-neu-
tral effects. In sum, Carter appointees supported burden-increasing 
outcomes in a higher percentage of votes than did Reagan judges 
(63.5% versus 51.8%), whereas Reagan appointees endorsed burden-
reducing results in a higher percentage of votes than their Carter 
counterparts (45.7% versus 33.3%). 
B. Majority Opinions Authored by Carter or Reagan Appointees 
A Carter or Reagan appointee authored the majority opinions in 
139 of the 241 decisions selected for detailed review. Of these, Carter 
appointees wrote the majority opinions in seventy-seven cases. In 
fifty-three of these seventy-seven cases (68.8%), the Carter appoin-
tees' majority opinions endorsed positions with burden-increasing 
consequences. In twenty-two cases (28.6%), the Carter judges sup-
105 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
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ported positions with burden-reducing effects. The Carter appoin-
tees supported burden-neutral results in the remaining two cases 
(2.6%). 
The Reagan appointees wrote majority opinions in sixty-two cases. 
In twenty-seven of these matters (43.5%), the Reagan appointees 
endorsed burden-increasing outcomes. In thirty-two instances 
(51.6%), the Reagan judges took positions with burden-reducing 
consequences. In the remaining three cases (4.8%), the Reagan 
judges supported burden-neutral outcomes. Thus, a considerably 
higher percentage of Carter-appointee majority opinions endorsed 
burden-increasing results (68.8% versus 43.5%). This corresponds 
with the higher percentage of Reagan appointee majority opinions 
resulting in burden-reducing outcomes (51.6% versus 28.6%). 
C. Votes Cast When Carter and Reagan Appointees Sat on the 
Same Panel 
Fifty-six of the 241 cases chosen for detailed review were decided 
by panels containing at least one Carter appointee and one Reagan 
appointee. In only seven of the fifty-six decisions (12.5%) did the 
Carter and Reagan appointees cast differing votes. 108 In four in-
stances in which the Carter and Reagan judges disagreed, the ma-
jority view supported burden-reducing results,109 and the remaining 
three decisions endorsed burden-increasing outcomes. 110 A Carter 
judge authored the majority opinion in only one decision,111 and a 
Reagan judge wrote one other majority opinion. 112 In these seven 
cases, Carter judges cast a total of seven votes, with six votes 
supporting burden-increasing outcomes and one vote endorsing a 
burden-reducing result. Reagan judges cast eight votes in these 
108 See, e.g., Atlantic City Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Regional Adm'r, 803 F.2d 96, 97, 103 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (majority opinion by Judge Stapleton, a Reagan appointee, and dissent by Judge 
Sloviter, a Carter appointee); Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 775 F.2d 1141, 
1141, 1151 (7th Cir. 1985) (majority opinion by Judge Cudahy, a Carter appointee, and dissent 
by Judge Coffey, a Reagan appointee). 
109 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 1988); 
National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988); Atlantic 
City Mun. Utils. Auth., 803 F.2d at 103; Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, 775 F.2d at 
1151. 
110 Ohio v. Department of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1990); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 
896 F.2d 354, 355 (9th Cir. 1990). 
111 See Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, 775 F.2d at 1141. 
112 See Atlantic City Mun. Utils. Auth., 803 F.2d at 97. 
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seven cases, with one vote supporting a burden-increasing outcome 
and the seven other votes approving burden-reducing results. 
Carter and Reagan judges cast identical votes in 87.5% of the 
cases in which appointees of both Presidents sat on the same panel. 
In twenty-six of the forty-nine cases (53.1%) in which Carter and 
Reagan appointees voted together, they endorsed burden-increasing 
outcomes. In twenty-two cases in which Carter and Reagan judges 
agreed (44.9%), they supported burden-reducing results. The deci-
sion in the remaining case (2%) had a burden-neutral effect. 
These results qualify conclusions drawn solely from a review of 
aggregate voting statistics. The high level of agreement on panels 
containing Carter and Reagan appointees could stem from a number 
of sources. For example, common voting on mixed panels could 
indicate an underlying similarity of perspectives. Such votes also 
could be attributable to the persuasive influence of specific judges in 
marshalling support for particular outcomes. Finally, common out-
comes could result from a judge's concern with the long-term insti-
tutional dynamic that might incline individual judges to achieve con-
sensus. 113 Without more decisions revealing disagreement on the 
same panel between Carter and Reagan appointees, it is difficult to 
predict accurately the likelihood of Carter or Reagan judges' en-
dorsing the positions adopted by their counterparts on panels con-
taining judges selected by one President but not the other. 
v. THE RESULTS INTERPRETED 
Aggregate data on the voting behavior of Carter and Reagan 
appointees to the federal courts of appeals show that Reagan judges 
endorsed burden-reducing outcomes in a higher percentage of cases 
than Carter judges. Of all votes cast by Reagan appointees, 45.7% 
supported burden-reducing results, 51.8% endorsed burden-increas-
ing results, and 2.5% adopted burden-neutral positions. 114 Of all 
votes cast by Carter appointees, 33.3% supported burden-reducing 
113 A study of voting behavior on three-judge appellate panels concluded that "[tlhe intrinsic 
loneliness of dissent on the circuits may well act as a deterrent to a single judge who faces 
the possibility of lone disagreement with the majority of judges." Richardson & Vines, Review, 
Dissent and the Appellate Process: A Political Interpretation, 29 J. POLITICS 597, 611 (1967). 
A judge also might acquiesce in a somewhat disagreeable outcome in one case in the hope of 
obtaining a colleague's support in other matters that the judge regards as more important. 
See W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 56-68 (1964) (discussing "bargaining" 
behavior within the Supreme Court). 
114 See infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text. 
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results, 63.5% endorsed burden-increasing outcomes, and 3.2% 
adopted burden-neutral positions. 
The results for majority opinions authored by Carter and Reagan 
appointees reveal greater statistical disparities. Majority opinions 
by Reagan appointees adopted burden-increasing positions 43.5% of 
the time, burden-reducing results 51.6% of the time, and burden-
neutral positions in 4.8% of the cases. Carter appointees' majority 
opinions supported burden-increasing positions 68.8% of the time, 
burden-reducing results 28.6% of the time, and burden-neutral re-
sults in 2.6% of the cases. 
The analysis of the judicial voting patterns from the three per-
spectives described reveals several trends. First, differences in 
Carter and Reagan appointees' voting behavior are most pronounced 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
Next to the United States Supreme Court, the District of Columbia 
Circuit is the nation's most important judicial forum for environ-
mental policymaking.u5 Second, Reagan appointees have shown a 
greater tendency to use procedural and remedial screens involving 
standing, damages, and attorneys' fees to reduce compliance bur-
dens. u6 Third, Reagan appointees have resorted more frequently to 
economic analysis to interpret and analyze statutory and regulatory 
commands. u7 Such analysis, however, does not systematically result 
in outcomes that reduce compliance burdens. 
A. The District of Columbia Circuit 
In the field of economic regulation, the District of Columbia Circuit 
is preeminent among the federal courts of appeals. Because of its 
central role in reviewing the decisions of federal regulatory agencies, 
the District of Columbia Circuit is singularly influential in developing 
doctrines governing the conduct of administrative agencies and in 
forming and applying substantive regulatory policy. U8 Among the 
courts of appeals, the District of Columbia Circuit is the foremost 
115 See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
116 See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. 
117 See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
118 See generally Wald, supra note 35. Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald provides the following 
evidence of the District of Columbia Circuit's importance: "In 1986, nearly 30 percent of the 
3,180 appeals from [federal administrative] agency decisions filed in the United States Circuit 
Courts came to us. No other circuit, except the Ninth with 20 percent, came close." Id. at 
508. See generally Pierce, supra note 45, at 303-08; Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The Rela-
tionship Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its Implications for a National 
Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048 (1984). 
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forum for judicial formulation of environmental policy.119 A mark of 
the District of Columbia Circuit's stature in shaping regulatory pol-
icy is the exacting attention given to the filling of vacancies in its 
membership. 120 With the exception of the Supreme Court, no court 
in the United States is more closely watched. 
District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions constituted the single 
largest body of case law considered in this survey. Of the 241 Clean 
Air Act and Clean Water Act cases chosen for detailed study, 46 
(19.1 %) were decided by the District of Columbia Circuit. Of the 413 
votes cast by Carter and Reagan appointees in the 241 decisions, 94 
votes (39%) were cast by members of the District of Columbia Cir~ 
cuit. By comparison, the next most active circuit in terms of relevant 
decisions and total votes was the Ninth Circuit, accounting for thirty-
five cases (14.5% of the survey total) and sixty-seven votes (16.2% 
of the survey total). To gain an additional perspective on District of 
Columbia Circuit Court voting, this survey also examined twenty-
six published decisions from January 20, 1977, through November 
30, 1990, in which Carter, Reagan, or Bush appointees participated 
on panels reviewing issues arising under RCRA. 
1. Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act Decisions 
Compared to the other courts of appeals, the District of Columbia 
Circuit's Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act decisions reveal a more 
pronounced disparity between the voting patterns of Carter and 
Reagan appointees. Carter appointees cast a total of 57 votes in 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act decisions during the survey 
period. Of these Carter appointees' votes, thirty-one (54.4%) sup-
ported burden-increasing outcomes; twenty-one votes (36.9%) en-
dorsed burden-reducing results; and the remaining five votes (8.7%) 
adopted burden-neutral positions. Reagan appointees cast a total of 
thirty-seven votes on the District of Columbia Circuit. Eleven of 
these votes (29.7%) supported burden-increasing outcomes, twenty-
five votes (67.6%) endorsed burden-reducing results, and one vote 
(2.7%) adopted a burden-neutral position. 
119 See generally R. HARRIS & S. MILKIS, supra note 25, at 272. In 1986, for example, the 
District of Columbia Circuit received 134 appeals from the EPA. The Ninth Circuit was second 
in EPA appeals with 23. Wald, supra note 35, at 508-09 (remarks of Chief Judge Wald). 
120 See Abramson, Failure of Appeals Court Nomination Means Next President to Fill 
Key Post, Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1988, at B7, col. 5; Carter, After Bork, A Rift Widens, Nat'l 
L.J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 2; Karpay, Bork or No Bork, GOP Bloc a Force on D.C. Circuit, 
Legal Times, Jan. 18, 1988, at 10, col. 1; Marcus, Conservatives' Grip on Influential Court 
May Slip, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1988, at A6, col. 1. 
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By comparison, a review of all of the votes of Carter and Reagan 
appointees outside the District of Columbia Circuit indicates a 
greater similarity in voting patterns. In 192 court of appeals votes 
in decisions outside the District of Columbia Circuit, Carter appoin-
tees supported burden-increasing results in 127 instances (66.1%). 
In sixty-two votes (32.3%) the Carter judges backed burden-reduc-
ing results, and in three votes (1.6%) Carter judges adopted burden-
neutral positions. Reagan appointees cast 127 votes outside the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. Reagan judges endorsed burden-increasing 
consequences in seventy-four of these votes (58.3%), burden-reduc-
ing outcomes in fifty votes (39.4%), and burden-neutral results in 
three instances (2.3%). 
Overall, in decisions outside of the District of Columbia Circuit, 
the voting patterns of Reagan appointees and Carter appointees 
have not differed dramatically. Reagan appointees supported bur-
den-increasing outcomes in a slightly lower percentage of votes 
(58.3% versus 66.1%) than their Carter counterparts. Similarly, Rea-
gan judges endorsed burden-reducing outcomes in a marginally 
higher percentage of votes than did Carter appointees (39.4% versus 
32.3%), but the disparity is not striking. In contrast, considering the 
District of Columbia Circuit alone reveals sharper differences in the 
voting patterns. Reagan appointees to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit adopted burden-increasing outcomes in a markedly lower per-
centage of votes than did the Carter appointees (29.7% versus 
54.4%). Additionally, Reagan judges endorsed burden-reducing out-
comes in a correspondingly higher percentage of votes than their 
Carter counterparts (67.6% versus 36.9%). However, in thirteen 
cases in which Carter and Reagan judges sat on the same panel, 
disagreement between the Carter and Reagan judges occurred in a 
single case. 121 In the twelve cases in which Carter and Reagan 
appointees agreed, four decisions supported burden-increasing out-
comes,122 and eight endorsed burden-reducing results. 123 
121 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
122 E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1230--31 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (rejecting industry challenges to certain EPA emissions restrictions; rejecting some 
environmental group challenges, but approving challenge to certain grandfathering exemp-
tions); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting 
automobile manufacturer's petition for review of EPA order requiring manufacturer to repair 
certain vehicles). 
123 E.g., Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1527 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (denying Wtition to compel the EPA to initiate rulemaking to control acid deposition 
that causes alarm in Canada); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
1991] REAGAN JUDICIARY 703 
2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Decisions 
The voting differences evident in Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act cases emerge even more sharply in the District of Columbia 
Circuit's RCRA cases. In the twenty-six RCRA cases examined in 
this survey, Carter and Reagan/Bush appointees each cast a total of 
thirty-six votes. In twenty-seven instances (75%), Carter judges 
endorsed a burden-increasing outcome. In the remaining nine votes 
(25%), Carter appointees supported burden-reducing results. In con-
trast, Reagan/Bush appointees cast burden-increasing votes in 
twelve instances (33.3%) and burden-reducing votes twenty-four 
times (66.6%). 
Carter and Reagan/Bush appointees sat on the same panel in 
seventeen RCRA cases. Eleven matters yielded agreement, with 
six decisions favoring burden-increasing outcomes124 and five sup-
porting burden-reducing results. 125 In six cases there was disagree-
ment between at least one Carter appointee and a Reagan/Bush 
appointee. 126 All six of these disagreement cases reached burden-
reducing results. Out of eleven votes cast in the six disagreement 
cases, Carter appointees approved a burden-increasing outcome 
seven times and a burden-reducing result four times. 127 By contrast, 
out of the fifteen votes cast in the six disagreement cases, Reagan/ 
(rejecting environmental group's claim that the EPA had unreasonably delayed completion of 
rulemaking concerning application of fugitive emissions controls to strip mines). 
124 E.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting 
industry group challenge to EPA rule barring land treatment; granting environmental group's 
petition for remand to require inclusion of certain residue previously omitted from rule); 
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting trade 
association's challenge to the EPA's regulation of treatment of certain industrial wastes). 
125 E.g., American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (re-
manding rule to the EPA for explanation of bases for relisting certain smelting wastes); 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting 
most challenges by waste control trade group and environmental group to adequacy of EPA 
rule governing land disposal of solvents and dioxins). 
126 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 88-1657 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1990) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Current file); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 907 F.2d 
1146, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1990); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 890 F.2d 1242, 1243 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 885 F.2d at 920; National Recycling 
Coalition, Inc. v. Reilly, 884 F.2d 1431, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American Mining Congress, 
824 F.2d at 1178. 
127 Five of the seven burden-increasing votes by Carter judges in disagreement cases were 
cast by Chief Judge Wald, who dissented from burden-reducing opinions in Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA, No. 88-1657 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Current 
file); Natural Resources Defense Council, 907 F.2d at 1166; National Recycling Coalition, 
890 F.2d at 1243; Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 885 F.2d at 927; National Recycling 
Coalition, 884 F.2d at 1438. 
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Bush judges endorsed burden-reducing outcomes fourteen times. 
The disagreement decisions did not involve a clean division between 
the Carter and Reagan/Bush appointees. In three of the six disagree-
ment cases, at least one Carter appointee endorsed the views of 
Reagan/Bush judges. 128 
3. The District of Columbia Circuit and the Other Circuits 
Compared: Summary 
As mentioned above, caution is appropriate in interpreting these 
aggregate voting statistics. The paucity of split panels involving 
disagreement among Carter and Reagan appointees in Clean Air Act 
and Clean Water Act cases precludes a more rigorous test of differ-
ences in pollution control preferences and attitudes toward economic 
regulation. The disparities apparent in the aggregate voting data 
are consistent with the hypothesis that Reagan appointees have 
narrower regulatory preferences. They do not, however, disprove 
the possibility that Carter and Reagan appointees in fact share 
environmental policy perspectives considerably more often than not. 
The voting data for the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit is consistent with studies that have identified pro-
nounced ideological splits in that court's disposition of economic reg-
ulation disputes. 129 Although judges on the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit sometimes have sought to downplay the 
degree of division,130 the divergence of Carter and Reagan judges 
128 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 88-1657 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1990) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Current file) (Carter judges Ruth Ginsburg and Abner Mikva joined 
the majority in casting burden-reducing votes); Natural Resources Defense Council, 907 F.2d 
at 1149 (burden-reducing votes cast by Reagan appointee Stephen Williams and Carter ap-
pointee Ruth Ginsburg); National Recycling Coalition, 884 F.2d at 1432 (burden-reducing 
votes cast by Reagan appointee James Buckley and Carter appointee Ruth Ginsburg). 
129 Professor Pierce, for example, writes that "the fate of a major agency policy decision 
reviewed by the D. C. Circuit will vary with the composition of the panel that reviews the 
agency action." Pierce, supra note 45, at 300. He finds that "[i]n cases with significant 
ideological implications-most major rulemakings--democratic D.C. Circuit judges are more 
likely to reverse agency policies at the behest of individuals, and republican D.C. Circuit 
judges are more likely to reverse agency policies challenged by business interests." [d. at 302; 
see also Karpay, En Banc Furor, Liberal Fury, Legal Times, May-June 1988, at 10 (segment 
from special supplement Reagan Justice, supra note 32). 
130 See Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: Dispelling 
Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619 (1985); Wald, supra note 35, 
at 552; Lewis, Dismissing the Politics in a Capital Circuit Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1991, 
at B4, col. 3; Sturgess, As Chief, Wald Kept Peace, Reorganized Court, Legal Times, Jan. 
21, 1991, at 6. Some public statements by the court's Carter appointees could be interpreted 
as critical of the Reagan administration's ideologically driven selection process. See Wald, 
Random Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting Appellate Judges, 6 J.L. & POL. 15,20-
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along the burden-reducing and burden-increasing lines is striking 
especially when compared to the results from other circuits. This 
divergence is particularly accentuated in RCRA decisions. The ag-
gregate voting data on Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA 
decisions suggests that a party favoring a lesser compliance burden 
probably will fare better before the District of Columbia Circuit with 
a panel dominated by Reagan appointees than with a panel controlled 
by Carter judges. Drawing a Carter-dominated panel, however, 
would not ensure a burden-reducing result. 
B. Treatment of Jurisdictional and Remedial Issues in Cases 
Involving Private Rights of Action 
The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act rely on decentralized 
monitoring and enforcement to ensure compliance with pollution 
abatement requirements. 131 By inviting oversight by private parties, 
decentralized monitoring serves the two aims of pressing govern-
mental agencies to fulfill their statutory and regulatory obligations 
and supplementing the government's efforts to attack private vio-
lations of various legal commands. 132 Although the use of decentral-
ized oversight is hardly a new phenomenon,133 recourse to private 
monitoring schemes has become an increasingly prominent congres-
21 (1989) (questioning whether "an executive intent upon perpetuating her ideology on the 
court" gives adequate attention "to the personality factors that are so indispensable to the 
making of a good judge and a smoothly functioning appellate court"). 
131 For discussions of the structure and significance of decentralized monitoring and enforce-
ment in environmental protection, see Albert, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Air Act: Uni-
versal Standing for the Uninjured p,rivate Attorney General?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
283, 309-27 (1988); Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 
835-50, 868-80 (1985); Comment, Environmental Law-Citizen Suits and Recovery of Civil 
Penalties, 36 U. RAN. L. REV. 529, 554-79 (1988); cf. Greve, The Non-Reformation of 
Administrative Law: Standing to Sue and Public Interest Litigation in West German Envi-
ronmental Law, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197 (1989) (discussing West German rejection of 
decentralized monitoring techniques in environmental regulation). 
132 See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 
1205-20 (1982) (distinguishing between "private rights of action," permitting challenges to 
private violations of federal law, and "private rights of initiation," allowing suits against 
agency officials to compel them to enforce regulations). 
133 See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-7 (1988)) (authorizing private treble damage suits for injuries resulting from restraints 
of trade or monopolistic conduct); False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version 
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988)) (authorizing private citizens to sue on behalf of the United 
States to recover damages and civil penalties for claims fraudulently presented to the gov-
ernment for payment). 
706 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 18:669 
sional strategy for ensuring fidelity to its policy commands. 134 Fed-
eral judges play a major role in determining the efficacy of decen-
tralized monitoring through their interpretations of statutory 
provisions that govern matters such as standing, remedies, and 
reimbursement for attorneys' fees. 135 Indeed, the treatment of stand-
ing and remedial issues in evaluating suits by private parties can be 
as important as the choice of liability standards in establishing the 
impact of a specific regulatory system. 136 
Of the 241 Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act cases examined in 
this survey, 48 involved issues concerning the ability of private 
parties to vindicate the policies of these environmental statutes. 
Carter appointees cast a total of forty-five votes in these cases. In 
thirty-five instances (77.8%), the Carter judges endorsed burden-
increasing outcomes,137 by facilitating private challenges either to 
government action or to private conduct in violation of statutory 
abatement requirements. In the remaining ten votes (22.2%) the 
Carter judges supported burden-reducing results. 13s Reagan judges 
cast a total of thirty-seven votes in the subset of forty-eight cases, 
casting eighteen burden-increasing votes (48.6%) and nineteen bur-
den-reducing votes (51.4%). 
134 This trend has been especially evident in the area of public procurement. In 1986, 
Congress substantially expanded the ability of, and incentives for, private citizens to attack 
misconduct by government contractors. See Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam 
Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341-49 (1989); Waldman, The 1986 Amendments to the False 
Claims Act: Retroactive or Prospective, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J. 469, 470-75 (1989). Over the 
past decade Congress also has increased the ability of disappointed bidders to attack govern-
ment violations of federal procurement statutes and regulations. See AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION, SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW, THE PROTEST EXPERIENCE UNDER THE 
COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT (July 6, 1989). 
135 See, e.g., Wardzinski, The Doctrine of Standing: Barriers to Judicial Review in the 
D.C. Circuit, NAT. RESOURCE & ENV'T, Fall 1990, at 7, 7-9, 42-43 (recent trend in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit-applying more stringent standing require-
ments for private parties challenging agency action in environmental litigation). 
136 For example, the Supreme Court's development of restrictive standing and remedial 
tests for private plaintiffs has been a crucial ingredient of the retrenchment of antitrust 
doctrine since the mid-1970s. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum Co., 110 
S. Ct. 1884, 1889 (1990) (limiting standing of private antitrust litigant to challenge a rival's 
establishment of a maximum resale price maintenance scheme); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (creating requirement that private antitrust 
plaintiffs plead and prove "antitrust injury"). But see California v. American Stores, Inc., 110 
S. Ct. 1853 (1990) (upholding ability of private litigants to obtain divestiture to remedy 
antitrust violations). 
137 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for illustrations of votes and cases that 
involve private rights of action and have burden-increasing effects. 
138 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text for illustrations of votes and cases that 
involve private rights of action and have burden-reducing results. 
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The aggregate voting data suggest that, compared to Carter ap-
pointees, the Reagan appointees have displayed a tendency to apply 
more restrictive procedural tests to claims of private citizens' groups 
in Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act disputes. For example, these 
decisions suggest an inclination among Reagan appointees to apply 
jurisdictional requirements more strictly139 and to scrutinize requests 
for attorneys' fees more closely.140 Carter appointees, by contrast, 
have tended to treat citizens' suits more generously, both in the 
analysis of jurisdictional requirements141 and in the disposition of 
attorneys' fees and remedial issues. 142 
Just as it was important to compare voting patterns of mixed 
panels in the analysis of all 241 Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act 
decisions,143 it is also important to compare the voting behavior in 
all private suit/remedies cases with the results involving decisions 
by mixed panels. Of the subset of forty-eight cases, fourteen were 
decided by a panel containing at least one Carter appointee and one 
Reagan/Bush appointee. The Carter and Reagan/Bush appointees 
agreed in twelve of the fourteen cases, reaching burden-increasing 
outcomes seven times, and endorsing burden-reducing consequences 
four times. In the two cases in which there was a disagreement, 
Reagan judges twice authored majority opinions that supported bur-
den-reducing outcomes. 144 Each of those opinions elicited a dissent 
by a Carter judge. Thus, without a larger number of observations 
139 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co., 817 F.2d 1169, 1170-72 (5th Cir. 1987) (decision 
by a panel of three Reagan appointees affirming dismissal of environmental group's lawsuit 
for failure to meet Clean Water Act jurisdictional requirements), cen. denied, 484 U.S. 1083 
(1988); Atlantic City Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Regional Adm'r, 803 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(dismissing effort by municipal authority to invoke citizen suit provision of the Clean Water 
Act). 
140 See, e.g., United States v. National Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 62,63 (6th Cir. 1986) (decision 
by panel including two Reagan judges affirming denial of environmental group/intervenor's 
application for attorneys' fees under the Clean Air Act). 
141 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(decision by panel including two Carter appointees, including opinion's author; held that federal 
five-year statute of limitations period, not state's three-year period, applies to citizen suit civil 
penalty action). 
142 See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 670 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(decision by three Carter appointees approving award of attorneys' fees to non-prevailing 
environmental group), vacated, 464 U.S. 806 (1983). 
143 See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text. 
144 See Atlantic City Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Regional Adm'r, 803 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(majority opinion by Judge Stapleton, a Reagan appointee; dissent by Judge Sloviter, a Carter 
appointee); National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 858 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(majority opinion by Judge Brunetti, a Reagan appointee; dissent by Judge Reinhardt, a 
Carter appointee). 
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indicating conflict among the Carter and Reagan/Bush appointees on 
the same panel, one must be cautious in assuming that judges chosen 
by one president would have disputed the outcome of cases decided 
by unmixed panels containing one or more judges selected by a 
different president. 
If the aggregate voting data indicates a genuine division in views 
concerning jurisdictional and remedial issues, the burden-reducing 
impact of Reagan/Bush appointee decisionmaking will be substantial. 
Private parties will encounter greater restrictions, such as harsher 
standing and jurisdictional tests, on their ability to raise and sustain 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act challenges. At the same time, 
the attractiveness of bringing suits will decline as prospective plain-
tiffs encounter additional difficulty in establishing entitlements to 
damages and in demonstrating eligibility to obtain attorneys' fees. 
Despite the limited number of mixed panel disagreement cases sur-
veyed, the aggregate voting data, nevertheless, suggests a genuine 
difference in preferences. 
C. Economic Analysis 
President Reagan's appointments to the courts of appeals included 
a number of individuals with extensive law and economics back-
grounds. 145 Among the most prominent Reagan appointees were 
academics such as Robert Bork, Pasco Bowman, Frank Easterbrook, 
Douglas Ginsburg, Richard Posner, Ralph Winter, and Stephen Wil-
liams, many of whom have advocated greater attention to wealth 
maximization as a decisionmaking principle in cases involving eco-
nomic regulation. 146 To some observers, the appointment of conser-
vative law and economics scholars foreshadows broad-based efforts 
by Reagan judges to apply efficiency criteria in reviewing statutes 
and regulations governing business conduct. 147 Majority opinions aut-
hored by prominent Reagan law and economics appointees have 
145 Dwyer, Law and Economics: A New Order in the Court?, Bus. WK., Nov. 16, 1987, at 
93. Reagan appointees, however, did not constitute the only subset of economically sophisti-
cated court of appeals judges. See Latin, Legal and Economic Considerations in the Decisions 
of Judge Breyer, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 57 (discussing decisions of Carter 
appointee Stephen Breyer). 
146 See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 102, at 66, 405-07 (arguing for efficiency-oriented 
interpretation of federal antitrust statutes); R. POSNER, supra note 101, at 286-315 (advocat-
ing use of economics in judicial decisionmaking); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-
Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-18 (1984) (presenting 
criteria for evaluating judicial performance in resolving economic issues). 
147 See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 163-89, 231-40, 255-57. 
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relied more extensively on economic analysis to assess the validity 
of pollution control requirements. For example, in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency148 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
ruled that the EPA could consider economic and technological fea-
sibility when establishing the "margin of safety" for hazardous pol-
lutants. 149 Judge Bork's opinion for a unanimous en banc court 
warned that to do otherwise might compel the EPA to promulgate 
a regulation that was irrational because its compliance costs would 
vastly outweigh abatement benefits.150 Nonetheless, the application 
of economic analysis has not systematically served to yield burden-
reducing outcomes. 151 
D. The Influence of the Bush Administration's Nominees 
The first two years of George Bush's presidency have featured 
noteworthy departures from the Reagan administration's philosophy 
toward economic regulation. In environmental protection President 
Bush has appointed regulatory agency officials with greater enthu-
siasm for government intervention than many of their Reagan ad-
ministration counterparts. 152 The Bush EPA has emphasized its in-
tent to enforce existing abatement requirements vigorously. 153 
Further, the Bush administration supported the enactment of the 
1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. 154 In tone and content, the 
148 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
149 I d. at 1163. 
150 See id. at 1163-66. 
151 See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1986) (opinion by Judge 
Posner); Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Judge Wilkinson), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 814 (1986). 
152 See Hahn, The Politics and Religion of Clean Air, REGULATION, Winter 1990, at 21, 
22; see also Cahan, Can the EPA Chief Clean up Bush's Image?, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 1989, 
at 135; Waldman, The Accidental Regulator, NEWSWEEK, May 7, 1990, at 24. 
153 See, e.g., Criminal Prosecutions, State Cooperation Seen as Key Enforcement Priorities 
in 1990,20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1714, 1715 (1990) (discussing Bush administration's commitment 
to expanded criminal prosecution for abatement noncompliance; quoting Richard Stewart, 
Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resources as saying, "We're no longer 
happy just nudging violators toward compliance. We intend to send a message that we want 
compliance now with no more foot-dragging."); Gold, Increasingly, Prison Term Is the Price 
for Polluters, N. Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991, at B6, col. 3 (describing Bush administration criminal 
enforcement initiatives). 
154 The Bush administration's original clean air legislative package is presented in Remarks 
Announcing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989,25 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 880-90 
(June 12, 1989). Consideration of revisions to the Clean Air Act featured continuing disagree-
ment between President Bush and Congress over the content of the 1990 amendments. See 
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 26 WEEKLY 
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Bush administration has moved federal environmental policy to the 
left of its Reagan-era equilibrium. 
The Bush administration's leftward shift in economic regulatory 
policy raises the question of how President Bush's judicial nomina-
tions will shape the regulatory preferences of the federal bench. 
From January 1989 through December 1990, the Bush administra-
tion accounted for only twenty-two new judges on the courts of 
appeals. 155 The pace of nominations began to increase after a period 
of little activity during the first six months of the Bush presidency. 156 
These judicial appointments promise to be particularly important for 
the future of environmental policy and other forms of economic 
regulation. Not only will the Bush appointments affect the regula-
tory preferences of the judiciary as a whole, but the filling of vacan-
cies on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will 
help determine how the nation's most influential intermediate ap-
pellate tribunal will review decisions by the EPA and other federal 
regulatory agencies. 157 
Should the Bush administration accelerate the pace of appoint-
ments and secure confirmation of its nominees, the cumulative im-
pact of Reagan and Bush appointments could affect the disposition 
of economic regulation cases to an extent not yet evident in decisions 
since 1981. 158 Reagan judges now either hold parity with non-Reagan 
judges or constitute narrow majorities on most of the federal courts 
of appeals. 159 If one assumes what may not be an entirely realistic 
COMPo PRES. Doc. 1462 (Sept. 26, 1990). In signing the new clean air bill, President Bush 
applauded the new measure, particularly its emphasis upon market-based incentives for 
pollution abatement. See Remarks on Signing the Bill Amending the Clean Air Act, 26 
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1822, 1823 (Nov. 15, 1990) (President Bush: "For the first time, 
we've moved away from the red tape bureaucratic approach of the past. The old tradition of 
command and control regulation is not the answer"). 
155 See Moran, In His Own Image, Legal Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at 15. 
156 See Pelham, Progress Seen in Filling Federal Bench, Legal Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1: 
see also Glaberson, Delays in Filling Vacancies Create U.S. Court Backlogs, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 15, 1989, at B3, col. 5 (describing delays in judicial appointments early in Bush admin-
istration); Marcus, Federal Judgeship Vacancies Pile up as Administration Enters Fifth 
Month, Wash. Post, May 23, 1989, at A13, col. 1 (same as Glaberson article). 
157 Through December 31, 1990, President Bush had appointed three members of the 
District of Columbia Circuit: Judges Karen Henderson, A. Raymond Randolph, and Clarence 
Thomas. See Moran, supra note 155, at 14. 
158 As of December 31, 1990, there were 126 vacancies on the federal district courts and 
courts of appeals-approximately 15% of the federal judiciary. Eighty-five of these positions 
were established by the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990. See id. 
159 This condition is true for the following circuits: District of Columbia, First, Second, 
Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth. See Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conser-
vative Trend in Courts, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1991, at AI, col. 3. 
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condition, that Reagan judges will serve long terms,160 the Bush 
appointments could create supermajorities of Reagan/Bush judges 
by 1992. If previous historical trends hold true, Reagan/Bush nom-
inees could account for as many as seventy-five percent of all federal 
court of appeals judges by the end of 1992.161 
Preliminary evidence suggests that President Bush will nominate 
judicial candidates who hold roughly the same bundle of ideological 
preferences held by Reagan administration appointees. 162 Establish-
ing supermajorities with narrow regulatory preferences would in-
crease the chances that two or more Reagan/Bush judges would sit 
on any individual panel. This could influence the disposition of cases 
in two important respects. First, it might raise the likelihood that 
burden-reducing outcomes would be achieved in any single case. l63 
160 In recent years, a great deal has been written about the possibility of mass defections 
from the federal bench if Congress did not increase compensation for judges substantially. 
See Grey, How to Guarantee a Mediocre Judiciary, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1989, at A27, col. 2; 
Bork, Miserable Wages, Miserable Leaders, N. Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1988, at A39, col. 2; Raven, 
Maintaining a Quality Judiciary: The Need for Adequate Compensation, ABA JOURNAL, 
Dec. 1, 1988, at 8. In 1989, Congress approved a new pay scale that sets a ceiling of $132,700 
for federal court of appeals judges. See Rehnquist Lauds Raise for Judges, Wash. Post, Jan. 
1, 1991, at A21, col. 1. This measure is likely to discourage departures for the time being. 
However, Reagan and Bush appointees have tended to be younger than their non-Reagan 
counterparts, and many face higher professional opportunity costs for staying on the bench. 
It remains possible that a Reagan/Bush "judicial revolution" within the federal district courts 
and courts of appeals will be impeded if periodic salary increases are not forthcoming. 
161 See Kamen & Marcus, A Chance to Deepen Stamp on the Courts, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 
1989, at AI, col. 4. 
162 See Goldman, supra note 31, at 329-30; Marcus, supra note 159, at AI, col. 3; Moran 
supra note 155, at 15; Lewis, Turning Loyalty and Ser"Vice to Bush into Power as Presidential 
Counsel, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1990, at B12, col. 1; Johnston, Bush Appears Set to Follow 
Reagan by Putting Conseroatives on Bench, N. Y. Times, May 31, 1989, at B5, col. 1; Kamen 
& Marcus, supra note 161; Abramson, Conseroative Legal Groups Plan Efforts to Keep Bush 
Administration on Reagan's Judicial Path, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1988, at A18, col. 1. 
163 It should be noted that voting results from the 241 cases in the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act survey do not reveal a difference in voting patterns when Carter or Reagan judges 
constitute a panel majority. In 64 cases, Carter appointees either constituted a majority in an 
en banc proceeding or held two or more seats on a three-judge panel. Forty of these cases 
(62.5%) reached burden-increasing outcomes; 18 cases (28.1%) adopted burden-reducing po-
sitions; 4 cases (6.3%) involved burden-neutral results; and, in two instances involving three-
judge panels, the two Carter judges disagreed with each other. These patterns are essentially 
consistent with aggregate Carter voting patterns in the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act 
cases. Out of 249 total votes, Carter appointees supported burden-increasing outcomes 158 
times (63.5%) and burden-reducing results 83 times (33.3%). 
Reagan appointee voting behavior reveals a similar consistency. Reagan judges held ma-
jorities in en bane deliberations or on three-judge panels in 38 cases. Twenty of these decisions 
(52.6%) supported a burden-increasing outcome; 15 decisions (39.5%) endorsed burden-reduc-
ing results; 1 case (2.6%) adopted a burden-neutral position; and, in two cases involving three-
judge panels, the two Reagan appointees disagreed with each other. Out of 164 total votes in 
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Second, and perhaps more important, it could alter the expressed 
basis on which a panel might impose a burden-reducing result. 
Where they constitute a majority on any given panel and hold a 
supermajority within a given circuit, Reagan/Bush judges might be 
inclined to endorse more extreme positions in writing majority opin-
ions. This tendency to adopt extreme positions would flow from the 
reduced need to achieve consensus with more moderate judges on 
three-judge panels and in en banc deliberations. Thus, the manner 
in which the Bush administration fills existing and forthcoming court 
of appeals vacancies could exert an increasingly pronounced quali-
tative influence on the course of environmental policy and other 
economic regulatory doctrine. 
There is a final respect in which President Bush's appointments 
will shape the overall impact of his administration's economic regu-
latory policies. As noted above,l64 Bush appointees to federal regu-
latory bodies such as the EPA have adopted noticeably more expan-
sive views of their agencies' roles than did their Reagan 
predecessors. The Bush regulators have pursued enforcement initia-
tives that the Reagan administration disfavored. 165 Continued selec-
tion of conservative appellate judges will mean that the fruits of new 
regulatory activism will face review by judges with narrower regu-
latory preferences. Although principles of judicial deference will 
constrain review of some agency actions, truly significant efforts to 
expand abatement obligations, either by rule making or choice of 
enforcement techniques, may receive unsympathetic treatment by 
regulation skeptics on the appellate courts. What the revitalized 
Bush regulatory agencies give, the Reagan/Bush appellate judges 
may take away. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Presidents can limit the reach of federal economic regulation in 
several ways. They can persuade Congress to narrow the statutory 
charters under which regulatory agencies operate. They can cut the 
budgets of enforcement agencies and thereby constrain the ability 
of regulators to bring new cases or enact new rules. They can appoint 
administrators with deregulatory philosophies, or they can attempt 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act cases, Reagan appointees supported burden-increasing 
outcomes 85 times (51.8%) and burden-reducing outcomes 75 times (45.7%). 
164 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
165 See Meier, FTC is Re-Emerging as a Watchdog on Prices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1991, 
at A16, col. 1 (discussing recent expansion of federal antitrust enforcement). 
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to use the Office of Management and Budget to examine proposals 
for new rules. In making appointments to the federal bench, presi-
dents can select regulation skeptics who will review regulatory com-
mands with an eye toward limiting the compliance burden on affected 
parties. 
Each of these techniques varies in its capacity to encumber future 
presidents when their constituency brings a more expansive set of 
regulatory preferences to the White House. Among the strategies 
with the greatest potential long-term impact is the choice of federal 
judges, particularly those in the courts of appeals who review the 
actions of influential regulatory bodies such as the EPA. The gradual 
process of judicial interpretation can have a profound effect upon 
the content of a regulatory scheme. As with the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act, the power to shape the substance of regulation 
is greatest when Congress has given an administrative body broad 
authority to implement general statutory commands. 
The cases reviewed in this Article suggest that the Reagan ap-
pointees to the federal courts of appeals have a greater inclination 
than their Carter counterparts to adopt positions that would reduce 
the burden of compliance in Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act 
cases. The results are not entirely clear-cut, as the relevant cases 
contained relatively few instances in which Carter and Reagan ap-
pointees sat on the same panel and disagreed as to the appropriate 
outcome. Keeping this important qualification in mind, it nonetheless 
appears that the Reagan administration succeeded in bringing less 
intervention-minded judges to the courts of appeals. This trend 
seems most pronounced on the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, whose influence over federal environmental policy 
among judicial tribunals is second only to that of the Supreme Court. 
